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## **From Monkey-like Action Recognition to Human Language: An Evolutionary Framework for Neurolinguistics**

Michael A. Arbib

Computer Science Department, Neuroscience Program, and USC Brain Project

University of Southern California

Los Angeles, CA 90089-2520

arbib@pollux.usc.edu; <http://www-hbp.usc.edu/>

### **ABSTRACT:**

The article analyzes the neural and functional grounding of language skills as well as their emergence in hominid evolution, hypothesizing stages leading from abilities known to exist in monkeys and apes and presumed to exist in our hominid ancestors right through to modern spoken and signed languages. The starting point is the observation that both premotor area F5 in monkeys and Broca's area in humans contain a "mirror system" active for both execution and observation of manual actions, and that F5 and Broca's area are homologous brain regions. This grounded the Mirror System Hypothesis of Rizzolatti & Arbib (1998) which offers the mirror system for grasping as a key neural "missing link" between the abilities of our non-human ancestors of 20 million years ago and modern human language, with manual gestures rather than a system for vocal communication providing the initial seed for this evolutionary process. The present article, however, goes "beyond the mirror" to offer hypotheses on evolutionary changes within and outside the mirror systems which may have occurred to equip *Homo sapiens* with a language-ready brain. Crucial to the early stages of this progression is the mirror system for grasping and its extension to permit imitation. Imitation is seen as evolving via a so-called "simple" system such as that found in chimpanzees (which allows imitation of complex "object-oriented" sequences but only as the result of extensive practice) to a so-called "complex" system found in humans (which allows rapid imitation even of complex sequences, under appropriate conditions) which supports pantomime. This is hypothesized to provide the substrate for the development of protosign, a combinatorially open repertoire of manual gestures, which then provides the scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech (which thus owes little to non-human vocalizations), with protosign and protospeech then developing in an expanding spiral. It is argued that these stages involve biological evolution of both brain and body. By contrast, it is argued that the progression from protosign and protospeech to languages with full-blown syntax and compositional semantics was a historical phenomenon in the development of *Homo sapiens*, involving few if any further biological changes.

**Key words:** gestures; hominids; language evolution; mirror system; neurolinguistics; primates; protolanguage; sign language; speech; vocalization

# 1. Action-Oriented Neurolinguistics and the Mirror System Hypothesis

## 1.1 *Evolving the Language-Ready Brain*

Two definitions:

- (i) A *protolanguage* is a system of utterances used by a particular hominid species (possibly including *Homo sapiens*) which we would recognize as a precursor to human language (if only the data were available!), but which is not itself a human language in the modern sense.<sup>1</sup>
- (ii) An infant (of any species) has a *language-ready* brain if it can acquire a full human language when raised in an environment in which the language is used in interaction with the child.

Does the language readiness of human brains require that the richness of syntax and semantics be encoded in the genome, or is language one of those feats – from writing history to building cities to using computers – that played no role in biological evolution, but which rested on historical developments that created societies that could develop and transmit these skills? My hypothesis is that:

*Language readiness evolved as a multi-modal manual/facial/vocal system with protosign (manual-based protolanguage) providing the scaffolding for protospeech (vocal-based protolanguage) to provide “neural critical mass” to allow language to emerge from protolanguage as a result of cultural innovations within the history of Homo sapiens.*<sup>2</sup>

The theory summarized here makes it understandable why it is as easy for a deaf child to learn a signed language as it is for a hearing child to learn a spoken language.

## 1.2. *The Mirror System Hypothesis*

Humans, chimps and monkeys share a general physical form and a degree of manual dexterity, but their brains, bodies and behaviors differ. Moreover, humans can and normally do acquire language, and monkeys and chimps cannot – though chimps and bonobos can be trained to acquire a form of communication that approximates the complexity of the utterances of a 2 year old human infant. The approach offered here to the evolution of brain mechanisms which support language is anchored in two observations: (a) the system of the monkey brain for visuomotor control of hand movements for grasping has its premotor outpost in an area called F5 which contains a set of neurons, called *mirror neurons*, each of which is active not only when the monkey executes a specific grasp but also when the monkey observes a human or other monkey execute a more-or-less similar grasp (Rizzolatti et al., 1995). Thus F5 in monkey contains a *mirror system for grasping* which employs a common neural code for *executed* and *observed* manual actions (Section 3.2 provides more details). (b) The region of the human brain homologous to F5 is part of Broca's area, traditionally thought of as a speech area, but which has been shown by brain imaging studies to be active when humans both execute and observe grasps. These findings led to:

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<sup>1</sup> Bickerton's (1995) views infant language, pidgins, and the “language” taught to apes as *protolanguages* in the sense of a form of communication whose users can only string together a small handful of words at a time with little if any syntax. Bickerton hypothesizes that the protolanguage (in my sense) of *Homo erectus* was a protolanguage in his sense, in which a few words much like those of today's language are uttered a few at a time to convey meaning without the aid of syntax. I do not assume (or agree with) this hypothesis.

<sup>2</sup> Today's signed languages are fully expressive human languages with a rich syntax and semantics, and are not to be confused with the posited properties of protosign. By the same token, protospeech is a primitive form of communication based on vocal gestures but without the richness of modern human spoken languages.

**The Mirror System Hypothesis** (Arbib and Rizzolatti, 1997; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998; henceforth R&A): *The parity requirement for language in humans – that what counts for the speaker must count approximately the same for the hearer<sup>3</sup> – is met because Broca's area evolved atop the mirror system for grasping with its capacity to generate and recognize a set of actions.*

One of the contributions of this paper will be to stress that the F5 mirror neurons in monkey are linked to regions of parietal and temporal cortex, and then argue that the evolutionary changes that “lifted” the F5-homologue of the common ancestor of human and monkey to yield human Broca’s area also “lifted” the other regions to yield Wernicke’s area and other areas that support language in the human brain.

Many critics have dismissed the mirror system hypothesis, stating correctly that monkeys do not have language and so the mere possession of a mirror system for grasping cannot suffice for language. But the key phrase here is “evolved atop” – and R&A discuss explicitly how changes in the primate brain might have adapted the use of the hands to support pantomime (intended communication) as well as praxis, and then outlined how further evolutionary changes could support language. The Hypothesis provides a neurological basis for the oft-repeated claim that hominids had a (proto)language based primarily on manual gestures before they had a (proto)language based primarily on vocal gestures (e.g., Hewes, 1973; Kimura, 1993; Armstrong et al., 1995; Stokoe, 2001). It could be tempting to hypothesize that certain species-specific vocalizations of monkeys (such as the snake and leopard calls of vervet monkeys) provided the basis for the evolution of human speech, since both are in the vocal domain. However, these primate vocalizations appear to be related to non-cortical regions as well as the anterior cingulate cortex (see, e.g., Jürgens, 1997) rather than the F5, the homologue of Broca's area. I think it likely (though empirical data are sadly lacking) that the primate cortex contains a mirror system for such species-specific vocalizations, and that a related mirror system persists in humans, but I suggest that it is a complement to, rather than an integral part of, the speech system that includes Broca's area in humans.

The Mirror System Hypothesis claims that a *specific* mirror system – the primate mirror system for grasping – evolved into a key component of the mechanisms that render the human language-ready brain. It is this specificity that will allow us to explain below why language is multi-modal, its evolution being based on the execution and observation of hand movements. There is no claim that mirroring or imitation is limited to primates. It is likely that an analogue of mirror systems exists in other mammals, especially those with a rich and flexible social organization. Moreover, the evolution of the imitation system for learning songs by male songbirds is divergent from mammalian evolution, but for the neuroscientist there are intriguing challenges in plotting the similarities and differences in the neural mechanisms underlying human language and birdsong (Doupe and Kuhl, 1999).<sup>4</sup>

The monkey mirror system for grasping is presumed to allow other monkeys to understand praxic actions – and using this understanding as a basis for cooperation, teamwork, averting a threat, etc. One might say that this is *implicitly* communicative, as a side effect of conducting an action for non-communicative goals. Similarly, the monkey's oro-facial gestures register emotional state, and primate vocalizations can also communicate something of

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<sup>3</sup> Since we will be concerned in what follows with sign language as well as spoken language, the "speaker" and "hearer" may be using hand and face gestures rather than vocal gestures for communication.

<sup>4</sup> I would welcome commentaries on “language-like” aspects of communication in non-primates but the present article is purely about changes within the primates.

the current priorities of the monkey, but to a first order this might be called "involuntary communication"<sup>5</sup> – these “devices” evolved to signal certain aspects of the monkey’s current internal state or situation either through its observable actions or through a fixed species-specific repertoire of facial and vocal gestures. I will develop the hypothesis that the mirror system made possible (but in no sense guaranteed) the evolution of the displacement of hand movements from praxis to gestures that can be controlled "voluntarily".

It is important to be quite clear as to what the Mirror System Hypothesis does *not* say.

(i) It does not say that having a mirror system is equivalent to having language. Monkeys have mirror systems but do not have language, and I expect that many species have mirror systems for varied socially relevant behaviors.

(ii) Having a mirror system for grasping is not in itself sufficient for the copying of actions. It is one thing to recognize an action using the mirror system; it is another thing to use that representation as a basis for repeating the action. Thus, further evolution of the brain was required for the mirror system for grasping to become an imitation system for grasping.

(iii) It does not say that language evolution can be studied in isolation from cognitive evolution more generally.

Arbib (2002) modified and developed the R&A argument to hypothesize seven stages in the evolution of language, with imitation grounding two of the stages.<sup>6</sup> The first three stages are pre-hominid:

**S1:** Grasping.

**S2:** A mirror system for grasping shared with the common ancestor of human and monkey.

**S3:** A simple imitation system for object-directed grasping through much repeated exposure. This is shared with common ancestor of human and chimpanzee.

The next three stages then distinguish the hominid line from that of the great apes:

**S4:** A complex imitation system for grasping – the ability to recognize another's performance as a set of familiar actions and then repeat them, or to recognize that such a performance combines novel actions which can be approximated by variants of actions already in the repertoire

**S5:** *Protosign*, a manual-based communication system, breaking through the fixed repertoire of primate vocalizations to yield an open repertoire.

**S6:** *Proto-speech*, resulting from the ability of control mechanisms evolved for protosign coming to control the vocal apparatus with increasing flexibility.

The final stage is claimed to involve little if any biological evolution, but instead to result from cultural evolution (historical change) in *Homo sapiens*:

**S7:** *Language*: the change from action-object frames to verb-argument structures to syntax and semantics; the co-evolution of cognitive and linguistic complexity.

The Mirror System Hypothesis is simply the assertion that the mechanisms which get us to the role of Broca’s area in language depend in a crucial way on the mechanisms established in Stage **S2**. The above seven stages provide just one set of hypotheses on how this dependence may have arisen. The task of this paper is to re-examine


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<sup>5</sup> It could be objected that monkey calls are not 'involuntary communication' because, for example, vervet alarm calls are given usually in the presence of conspecifics who would react to them. However, I would still call this involuntary – this just shows that two conditions, rather than one, are required to trigger the call. This is distinct from the human use of language to conduct a conversation that may have little or any connection to the current situation.

this progression, responding to critiques by amplifying the supporting argument in some cases, and tweaking the account in others. I believe that the overall framework is robust, but there are many details to be worked out, and a continuing stream of new and relevant data and modeling to be taken into account.

The claim for the crucial role of manual communication in language evolution remains controversial. MacNeilage (1998, 2003), for example, has argued that language evolved directly as speech (A companion paper [Arbib, 2004a] details why I reject MacNeilage’s argument. The basic point is to distinguish the evolution of the ability to use gestures that convey meaning from the evolution of syllabification as a way to structure vocal gestures.)

A note to commentators: The arguments for stages S1 through S6 can and should be evaluated quite independently of the claim that the transition to language was cultural rather than biological.



**Figure 1.** A Performance View of the production and perception of language.

The neurolinguistic approach offered here is part of a performance approach which explicitly analyzes both perception and production (Figure 1). For Production, we have much that we could possibly talk about which is represented as cognitive structures (Cognitive Form; schema assemblages) from which some aspects are selected for possible expression. Further selection and transformation yields semantic structures (hierarchical constituents expressing objects, actions and relationships) which constitute a Semantic Form which is enriched by linkage to schemas for perceiving and acting upon the world (Arbib, 2003a; Rolls and Arbib, 2003). Finally, the ideas in the Semantic Form must be expressed in words whose markings and ordering are expressed in Phonological Form – which may include a wide range of ordered expressive gestures whether manual, orofacial or vocal. For Perception, the received sentence must be interpreted semantically with the result updating the "hearer's" cognitive structures. For example, perception of a visual scene may reveal “Who is doing what and to whom/which” as part of a non-linguistic *action-object frame* in cognitive form. By contrast, the *verb-argument structure* is an overt linguistic representation in semantic form – in modern human languages, generally the action is named by a verb and the objects are named by nouns or noun phrases (see Section 7). A production grammar for a language is then a specific mechanism (whether explicit or implicit) for converting verb-argument structures into strings of words (and hierarchical compounds of verb-argument structures into complex sentences) and vice versa for perception.

<sup>6</sup> When I speak of a “stage” in phylogeny, I do not have in mind an all-or-none switch in the genotype that yields a discontinuous change in the phenotype, but rather the coalescence of a multitude of changes that can be characterized as forming a global pattern that may emerge over the course of tens or even hundreds of millennia.

In the brain there may be no single grammar serving both production and perception, but rather a “direct grammar” for production and an “inverse grammar” for perception. Jackendoff (2002) offers a competence theory with a much closer connection with theories of processing than has been common in generative linguistics and suggests (his Section 9.3) strategies for a two-way dialogue between competence and performance theories. Jackendoff’s approach to competence appears to be promising in this regard because it attends to the interaction of, e.g., phonological, syntactic and semantic representations. There is much, too, to be learned from a variety of approaches to Cognitive Grammar which relate cognitive form to syntactic structure (see, e.g., Heine, 1997; Langacker, 1987,1991; Talmy, 2000).

The next section provides a set of criteria for language readiness and further criteria for what must be added to yield language. It concludes (Section 2.3) with an outline of the argument as it develops in the last 6 sections of the paper.

## 2. Language, Protolanguage, and Language Readiness

I earlier defined a protolanguage as any system of utterances which served as a precursor to human language in the modern sense and hypothesized that the first *Homo sapiens* had protolanguage and a “language-ready brain” but did not have language.

Contra Bickerton (see Footnote 1) I will argue in Section 7 that the prelanguage of *Homo erectus* and early *Homo sapiens* was composed mainly of “unitary utterances” which symbolized frequently occurring situations (in a general sense) without being decomposable into distinct words denoting components of the situation or their relationships. Words as we know them then co-evolved culturally with syntax through fractionation. On this view, many ways of expressing relationships that we now take for granted as part of language were the discovery of *Homo sapiens*, e.g., adjectives and the fractionation of nouns from verbs may be “post-biological” in origin.

### 2.1. Criteria for Language Readiness

Here are properties hypothesized to support protolanguage:

**LR1: Complex Imitation:** The ability to recognize another's performance as a set of familiar movements and then repeat them, but also to recognize that such a performance combines novel actions which can be approximated by (i.e., more or less crudely be imitated by) variants of actions already in the repertoire.<sup>7</sup>

The idea is that this capacity – as distinct from the simple imitation system for object-directed grasping through much repeated exposure which is shared with chimpanzees – is necessary to support properties LR2 and LR3, including the idea that symbols are potentially arbitrary rather than innate:

**LR2: Symbolization:** The ability to associate symbols with an open class of episodes, objects or actions.

At first, these symbols may have been unitary utterances, rather than words in the modern sense, and they may have been based on manual and facial gestures rather than being vocalized.

**LR3. Parity (Mirror Property):** What counts for the speaker (or producer) must count for the listener (or receiver).

This extends Property LR2 by ensuring that symbols can be shared, and thus is bound up with

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<sup>7</sup> The attainment of complex imitation was seen as a crucial stage of the evolution of language readiness in Arbib (2002), but was not listed there as a condition for language-readiness. I now see this as a mistake, though it might be argued that the other conditions between them imply the capacity for complex imitation for symbols and the gestures from which they are composed.

**LR4. Intended Communication:** Communication is intended by the utterer to have a particular effect on the recipient, rather than being involuntary or a side effect of praxis.

The remainder are more general properties, delimiting cognitive capabilities that underlie a number of the ideas which eventually find their expression in language:

**LR5: From Hierarchical Structuring to Temporal Ordering:** Perceiving that objects and actions have sub-parts; finding the appropriate timing of actions to achieve goals in relation to those hierarchically structured objects.

A basic property of language – translating a hierarchical conceptual structure into a temporally ordered structure of actions – is in fact not unique to language but is apparent whenever an animal takes in the nature of a visual scene and produces appropriate behavior. Animals possess subtle mechanisms of action-oriented perception with no necessary link to the ability to communicate about these components and their relationships. To have such structures does not entail the ability to communicate by using words or articulatory gestures (whether signed or vocalized) in a way that reflects these structures.

Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002) assert that the faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN) includes only recursion and is the one uniquely human component of the faculty of language. However, the flow diagram given by Byrne (2003) shows that the processing used by a mountain gorilla when preparing bundles of nettle leaves to eat is clearly recursive. Gorillas (like many other species, and not only mammals) have the working memory to refer their next action not only to sensory data but also to the state of execution of some current plan. Thus when we refer to the monkey's grasping and ability to recognize similar grasps in others, it is a mistake to treat the individual grasps in isolation – the F5 system is part of a larger system that can direct those grasps as part of a recursively structured plan.

Let me simply list the next 2 properties here and then expand upon them in the next section:

**LR6: Beyond the Here-and-Now 1:** The ability to recall past events or imagine future ones.

**LR7: Paedomorphy and Sociality:** Paedomorphy is the prolonged period of infant dependency which is especially pronounced in humans; this combines with social structures for caregiving to provide the conditions for complex social learning.

Where Deacon (1997) makes symbolization central to his account of the co-evolution of language and the human brain, the present account will stress the parity property LR3, since it underlies the sharing of meaning, and the capacity for complex imitation. I will also argue that only protolanguage co-evolved with the brain, and that the full development of linguistic complexity was a cultural/historical process that required little or no further change from the brains of early *Homo sapiens*.

Later sections will place LR1-LR7 in an evolutionary context (see Section 2.3 for a summary), showing how the coupling of complex imitation to complex communication come together to create a language-ready brain.

## 2.2. Criteria for Language

We next present four criteria for what must be added to the brain's capabilities for the parity, hierarchical structuring, and temporal ordering of language readiness to yield *language*. Nothing in this list rests on the medium of exchange of the language, applying to spoken language, sign language or written language, for example. My claim is that brains which can support properties LR1 through LR6 above can support properties L1 through L4 below – so long as its “owner” matures in a society that possesses language in the sense so defined and nurtures the child to acquire it. In other words, I claim that the mechanisms which make LR1 through LR7 possible are supported

by the genetic encoding of brain and body and the consequent space of possible social interactions but that the genome has no additional structures specific to L1 through L4. In particular, the genome does not have special features encoding syntax and its linkage to a compositional semantics.

I suggest that "true language" involves the following further properties beyond LR1 through LR7:

**LA1: Symbolization and Compositionality:** The symbols become words in the modern sense, interchangeable and composable in the expression of meaning.<sup>8</sup>

**LA2: Syntax, Semantics and Recursion:** The matching of syntactic to semantic structures co-evolves with the fractionation of utterances, with the nesting of substructures making some form of recursion inevitable.

LA1 and LA2 are intertwined. Section 7 will offer candidates for the sorts of discoveries that may have led to progress from "unitary utterances" to more or less structured assemblages of words. Given the view (LR5) that recursion of action (but not of communication) is part of language readiness, the key transition here is the compositionality that allows cognitive structure to be reflected in symbolic structure (the transition from LR2 to LA1), as when perception (not uniquely human) grounds linguistic description (uniquely human) so that, e.g., the NP [noun phrase] describing a part of an object may optionally form part of the NP describing the overall object. From this point of view, recursion in language is a corollary of the essentially recursive nature of action and perception *once symbolization becomes compositional*.

The last two principles provide the linguistic complements of two of the conditions for language readiness, LR6 (Beyond the Here-and-Now 1) and LR7 (Paedomorphy and Sociality), respectively.

**LA3: Beyond the Here-and-Now 2:** Verb tenses or other circumlocutions express the ability to recall past events or imagine future ones.

There are so many linguistic devices for going beyond the here and now, and beyond the factual, that verb tenses are mentioned to stand in for all the devices languages have developed to communicate about other "possible worlds" that are far removed from the immediacy of, say, the vervet monkey's leopard call.

If one took a human language and removed all reference to time one might still want to call it a language rather than a protolanguage, even though one would agree that it was thereby greatly impoverished. Similarly, the number system of a language can be seen as a useful, but not definitive, "plug in". LA3 nonetheless suggests that the ability to talk about past and future is a central part of human languages as we understand them. However, all this would be meaningless (literally) without the underlying cognitive machinery – the substrate for episodic memory provided by the hippocampus (Burgess, Jeffery, and O'Keefe, 1999) and the substrate for planning provided by frontal cortex (Passingham, 1993, Chapter 10). It is not part of the Mirror System Hypothesis to explain the evolution of the brain structures that support LR6; it is an exciting challenge for work "beyond the mirror" to show how such structures could provide the basis for humans to discover the capacities for communication summarized in LA3.

**LA4: Learnability:** To qualify as a human language, much of the syntax and semantics of a human language must be learnable by most human children.

I say "much of" because it is not true that children master all the vocabulary or syntactic subtlety of a language by 5 or 7 years of age. Language acquisition is a process that continues well into the teens as we learn more subtle

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<sup>8</sup> I wonder at times whether properties LR1 through LR 7 do indeed support LA1 or whether LA1 should itself be seen as part of the biological equipment of language readiness. I would welcome commentaries in support of either of these alternatives.

syntactic expressions and a greater vocabulary to which to apply them (C. Chomsky, 1969, traces the changes that occur from ages 5 to 10), allowing us to achieve a richer and richer set of communicative and representational goals.

LR7 and LA4 link a biological condition “orthogonal” to the Mirror System Hypothesis with a “supplementary” property of human languages. This supplementary property is that languages do not simply exist – they are acquired anew (and may be slightly modified thereby) in each generation (LA4). The biological property is an inherently social one about the nature of the relationship between parent (or other caregiver) and child (LR7) – the prolonged period of infant dependency which is especially pronounced in humans has co-evolved with the social structures for caregiving that provide the conditions for the complex social learning that makes possible the richness of human cultures in general and of human languages in particular.

### 2.3. *The Argument in Perspective*

The argument unfolds in the remaining 6 sections as follows:

3. *Perspectives on Grasping and Mirror Neurons*: This section presents two models of the macaque brain. A key point is that the functions of mirror neurons reflect the impact of experience rather than being pre-wired..

4. *Imitation*: This section presents the distinction between simple and complex imitation systems for grasping, and argues that monkeys have neither, that chimpanzees have only simple imitation, and that the capacity for complex imitation involved hominid evolution since the separation from our common ancestors with the great apes, including chimpanzees.

5. *From Imitation to Protosign*: The section examines the relation between symbolism, intended communication and parity, and looks at the multiple roles of the mirror system in supporting pantomime and then conventionalized gestures which support a far greater range of intended communication.

6. *The Emergence of Protospeech*: This section argues that evolution did not proceed directly from monkey-like primate vocalizations to speech but rather proceeded from vocalization to manual gesture and back to vocalization again.

7. *The Inventions of Languages*: This section argues that the transition from action-object frames to verb-argument structures embedded in larger sentences structured by syntax and endowed with a compositional semantics was the effect of the accumulation of a wide range of human discoveries that had little if any impact on the human genome.

8. *Towards a Neurolinguistics “Beyond the Mirror”*: This section extracts a framework for action-oriented linguistics informed by our analysis of the “extended Mirror System Hypothesis” presented in the previous sections. The language-ready brain contains the evolved mirror system as a key component but also includes many other components that lie outside, though they interact with, the mirror system.

Table 1 shows how these sections relate the evolutionary stages **S1** through **S7**, and their substages, to the above criteria for language-readiness and language.<sup>9</sup>

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However, I remain adamant that LR1 through LR7 coupled with LA1 provides all that is needed for a brain to support LA2, LA3, and LA4.

<sup>9</sup> The pairs (LR6: Beyond the here-and-now 1, LA3: Beyond the here-and-now 2) and (LR7: Paedomorphy and sociality, LA4: Learnability,) do not appear in Table 1 since the rest of the paper will not add to their brief treatment in Section 2.2.

**Table 1.** A comparative view of how the following selections relate the criteria LR1-LR, for language readiness and LA1-LA2 for language (middle column) to the seven stages, S1-S7, of the extended Mirror System Hypothesis (right column).

Section	Criteria	Stages
2.1	<b>LR5: From hierarchical structuring to temporal ordering</b>	This precedes the evolutionary stages charted here.
3.1		<b>S1: Grasping</b> The FARS Model.
3.2		<b>S2: Mirror system for grasping</b> Modeling Development of the Mirror System. This supports the conclusion that mirror neurons can be recruited to recognize and encode an expanding set of novel actions
4	<b>LR1: Complex imitation</b>	<b>S3: Simple imitation</b> This involves properties of the mirror system beyond the monkey data. <b>S4: Complex imitation</b> This is argued to distinguish humans from other primates.
5	<b>LR2: Symbolization</b> <b>LR4: Intended Communication</b> <b>LR3: Parity (Mirror Property)</b>	<b>S5: Protosign</b> The transition of complex imitation from praxic to communicative use involves two substages: S5a: the ability to engage in pantomime; S5b: the ability to make conventional gestures to disambiguate pantomime
6.1		<b>S6: Proto-speech</b> It is argued that early protosign provided the scaffolding for early protospeech after which both developed in an expanding spiral till protospeech became dominant for most people
7	<b>LA1: Symbolization and compositionality</b> <b>LA2: Syntax, semantics and recursion</b>	<b>S7: Language</b> The transition from action-object frame to verb-argument structure to syntax and semantics.
8		The evolutionary developments of the preceding sections are restructured into synchronic form to provide a framework for further research in neurolinguistics, relating the capabilities of the human brain for language, action recognition and imitation.

### 3. Perspectives on Grasping and Mirror Neurons

*Mirror neurons* in F5, which are active both when the monkey performs certain actions and when the monkey observes them performed by others, are to be distinguished from *canonical neurons* in F5 which are active when the monkey performs certain actions but not when the monkey observes actions performed by others. More subtly, canonical neurons fire when they are presented with a graspable object, irrespective of whether the monkey performs the grasp or not – but clearly this must depend on the extra (inferred) condition that the monkey not only sees the object but is aware, in some sense, that it is possible to grasp it. Were it not for the caveat, canonical neurons would also fire when the monkey observed the object being grasped by another.

The “classic” mirror system hypothesis (Section 1.2) emphasizes the grasp-related neurons of monkey premotor area F5 and the homology of this region with human Broca’s area. However, Broca’s area is part of a larger system supporting language, and so we need to enrich the mirror system hypothesis by seeing how the mirror system for grasping in monkey includes a variety of brain regions in addition to F5. We show this by presenting data and models which locate the canonical system of F5 in a systems perspective (the FARS model of Section 3.1) and then place the mirror system of F5 in a system perspective (the MNS model of Section 3.2)

### ***3.1. The FARS Model***

Given our concern with hand use and language, it is striking that the ability to use the size of an object to preshape the hand while grasping it can be dissociated by brain lesions from the ability to consciously recognize and describe that size. Goodale et al. (1991) studied a patient (DF) whose cortical damage allowed signals to flow from primary visual cortex (V1) towards posterior parietal cortex (PP) but not from V1 to inferotemporal cortex (IT). When asked to indicate the width of a single block by means of her index finger and thumb, her finger separation bore no relationship to the dimensions of the object and showed considerable trial to trial variability. Yet when she was asked simply to reach out and pick up the block, the peak aperture (well before contact with the object) between her index finger and thumb changed systematically with the width of the object, as in normal controls. A similar dissociation was seen in her responses to the orientation of stimuli. In other words, DF could preshape accurately, even though she appeared to have no conscious appreciation (expressible either verbally or in pantomime) of the visual parameters that guided the preshape. Jeannerod et al. (1994) report a study of impairment of grasping in a patient (AT) with a bilateral posterior parietal lesion of vascular origin that left IT and the pathway V1  $\rightarrow$  IT relatively intact, but grossly impaired the pathway V1  $\rightarrow$  PP. This patient can reach without deficit toward the location of such an object, but cannot preshape appropriately when asked to grasp it.


A corresponding distinction in the role of these pathways in the monkey is crucial to the FARS model (named for Fagg, Arbib, Rizzolatti and Sakata; Fagg and Arbib 1998) which embeds F5 canonical neurons in a larger system. Taira et al. (1990) found that AIP cells (in the anterior intraparietal sulcus of parietal cortex) extract neural codes for *affordances* for grasping from the visual stream and sends these on to area F5. Affordances (Gibson, 1979) are features of the object relevant to action, in this case to grasping, rather than aspects of identifying the object’s identity. Turning to human data: Ehrsson et al. (2003) compared the brain activity when humans attempted to lift an immovable test object held between the tips of the right index finger and thumb with the brain activity obtained in two control tasks in which neither the load force task nor the grip force task involved coordinated grip-load forces. They found that the grip-load force task was specifically associated with activation of a section of the right intraparietal cortex. Culham et al. (2003) found greater activity for grasping than reaching in several regions, including anterior intraparietal (AIP) cortex. Although the lateral occipital complex (LOC), a ventral stream area believed to play a critical role in object recognition, was activated by the objects presented on both grasping and reaching trials, there was no greater activity for grasping compared to reaching.

The FARS model analyzes how the “canonical system”, centered on the AIP  $\rightarrow$  F5 pathway, may account for basic phenomena of grasping. The highlights of the model are shown in Figure 2<sup>10</sup> which diagrams the crucial role

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<sup>10</sup> Figure 2 provides only a partial overview of the model. The full model (see Fagg and Arbib 1988 more details) includes a number of brain regions, offering schematic models for some and detailed neural network models for others. The model has been

of IT (inferotemporal cortex) and PFC (prefrontal cortex) in modulating F5's selection of an affordance. The *dorsal stream* (from primary visual cortex to parietal cortex) carries the information needed for AIP to recognize that different parts of the object can be grasped in different ways, thus extracting affordances for the grasp system which are then passed on to F5. The dorsal stream does not know "what" the object is, it can only see the object as a set of possible affordances. The *ventral stream* (from primary visual cortex to inferotemporal cortex), by contrast, is able to recognize what the object is. This information is passed to prefrontal cortex which can then, on the basis of the current goals of the organism and the recognition of the nature of the object, bias AIP to choose the affordance appropriate to the task at hand. The original FARS model posited connections between prefrontal cortex and F5. However, there is evidence (reviewed by Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001) that these connections are very limited whereas rich connections exist between prefrontal cortex and AIP. Rizzolatti and Luppino (2003) thus suggested that FARS be modified so that information on object semantics and the goals of the individual influence AIP rather than F5 neurons. We show the modified schematic in Figure 2. The modified figure represents the way in which AIP may accept signals from areas F6 (pre-SMA), 46 (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), and F2 (dorsal premotor cortex) to respond to task constraints, working memory, and instruction stimuli, respectively. In other words, AIP provides cues on how to interact with an object, leaving it to IT to categorize the object or determine its identity.



**Figure 2.** A reconceptualization of the FARS model in which the primary influence of PFC (prefrontal cortex) on the selection of affordances is on parietal cortex (AIP, anterior intraparietal sulcus) rather than premotor cortex (the hand area F5).

Although the data on cell specificity in F5 and AIP emphasize single actions, these actions are normally part of more complex behaviors – to take a simple example, a monkey who grasps a raisin will, in general, then proceed to eat it. Moreover, a particular action might be part of many learned sequences and so we do not expect the premotor neurons for one action to prime a single possible consequent action and thus must reject “hard wiring” of the sequence. The generally adopted solution is to segregate the learning of a sequence from the circuitry which encodes the unit actions, the latter being F5 in the present study. Instead, another area (possibly the part of the supplementary motor area called pre-SMA; Rizzolatti, Luppino and Matelli 1998) has neurons whose connections encode an

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implemented on the computer so that simulations can demonstrate how the activity of different populations vary to explain the linkage between visual affordance and manual grasp.

"abstract sequence" Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, with sequence learning then involving learning that activation of Q1 triggers the F5 neurons for A, Q2 triggers B, Q3 triggers A again, and Q4 triggers C. Other studies suggest that administration of the sequence (inhibiting extraneous actions, while priming imminent actions) is carried out by the basal ganglia on the basis of its interactions with the pre-SMA (Bischoff-Grethe et al., 2003; see Dominey, Arbib & Joseph (1995, for an earlier model of the possible role of the basal ganglia in sequence learning).

### ***3.2. Modeling Development of the Mirror System***


The populations of canonical and mirror neurons appear to be spatially segregated in F5 (Rizzolatti & Luppino 2001). Both sectors receive a strong input from the secondary somatosensory area (SII) and parietal area PF. In addition, canonical neurons are the selective target of area AIP. Perrett et al. (1990; Carey et al.1997) found that STSa, in the rostral part of the superior temporal sulcus (STS), has neurons which discharge when the monkey observes such biological actions as walking, turning the head, bending the torso and moving the arms. Of most relevance to us is that a few of these neurons discharged when the monkey observed goal-directed hand movements, such as grasping objects (Perrett et al., 1990) – though STSa neurons do not seem to discharge during movement execution as distinct from observation. STSa and F5 may be indirectly connected via inferior parietal area PF (Brodmann area 7b) (Petrides and Pandya, 1984; Matelli et al., 1986; Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Seltzer and Pandya, 1994). About 40% of the visually responsive neurons in PF are active for observation of actions such as holding, placing, reaching, grasping and bimanual interaction. Moreover, most of these action observation neurons were also active during the execution of actions similar to those for which they were “observers”, and were thus called PF mirror neurons (Fogassi et al., 1998).

In summary, area F5 and area PF include an observation/execution matching system: When the monkey observes an action that resembles one in its movement repertoire, a subset of the F5 and PF mirror neurons is activated which also discharge when a similar action is executed by the monkey itself. We next develop the conceptual framework for thinking about the relation between F5, AIP and PF. Section 6.1 expands the mirror neuron database, reviewing the reports by Kohler et al. (2002) of a subset of mirror neurons responsive to sounds and by Ferrari et al. (2003) of neurons responsive to the observation of oro-facial communicative gestures.

The FARS model of the canonical system (Figure 2) shows the importance of object recognition (inferotemporal cortex) and "planning" (prefrontal cortex) in modulating the selection of affordances in the determination of action. Figure 3 provides a glimpse of the schemas (functions) involved in the MNS1 model (Oztop and Arbib, 2002) of the monkey mirror system<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> To keep the exposition compact, in what follows I will use without further explanation the abbreviations for the brain regions not yet discussed. The reader wanting to see the abbreviations spelled out, as well as a brief exposition of data related to the hypothesized linkage of schemas to brain structures, is referred to Oztop and Arbib (2002).



**Figure 3.** A schematic view of the Mirror Neuron System One (MNS1) model (Oztop and Arbib, 2002)

First, we look at those elements involved when the monkey itself reaches for an object. Areas IT and cIPS provide visual input concerning the nature of the observed object and the position and orientation of the object's surfaces, respectively, to AIP. The job of AIP is then to extract the affordances the object offers for grasping. The upper diagonal in Figure 3 corresponds to the basic pathway AIP → F5canonical → M1 (primary motor cortex) of the FARS model, but Figure 3 does not include the important role of PFC in action selection. The lower right diagonal (MIP/LIP/VIP → F4) completes the "canonical" portion of the MNS model, since motor cortex must not only instruct the hand muscles how to grasp but also (via various intermediaries) the arm muscles how to reach, transporting the hand to the object. The rest of Figure 3 presents the core elements for the understanding of the mirror system. Mirror neurons do not fire when the monkey sees the hand movement or the object in isolation – it is the sight of the hand moving appropriately to grasp or otherwise manipulate a seen (or recently seen) object that is required for the mirror neurons attuned to the given action to fire. This requires schemas for the recognition of both the shape of the hand and analysis of its motion (ascribed in the figure to STS), and for analysis of the relation of these hand parameters to the location and affordance of the object (7a and 7b; we identify 7b with PF).

In the MNS1 model, the *hand state* was accordingly defined as a vector whose components represented the movement of the wrist relative to the location of the object and of the hand shape relative to the affordances of the object. Oztop and Arbib (2002) showed that an artificial neural network corresponding to PF and F5<sub>mirror</sub> could be trained to recognize the grasp type from the *hand state trajectory*, with correct classification often being achieved well before the hand reached the object. The modeling assumed that the neural equivalent of a grasp being in the monkey's repertoire is that there is a pattern of activity in the F5 canonical neurons that commands that grasp. During training, the output of the F5 canonical neurons, acting as a code for the grasp being executed by the monkey at that time, was used as the training signal for the F5 mirror neurons to enable them to learn which hand-object trajectories corresponded to the canonically encoded grasps. Moreover, the input to the F5 mirror neurons encodes

the trajectory of the relation of parts of the hand to the object rather than the visual appearance of the hand in the visual field. As a result of this training, the appropriate mirror neurons come to fire in response to viewing the appropriate trajectories even when the trajectory is not accompanied by F5 canonical firing.

This training prepares the F5 mirror neurons to respond to hand-object relational trajectories even when the hand is of the "other" rather than the "self" because the hand state is based on the movement of a hand relative to the object, and thus only *indirectly* on the retinal input of seeing hand and object which can differ greatly between observation of self and other. What makes the modeling worthwhile is that the trained network responded not only to hand state trajectories from the training set, but also exhibited interesting responses to novel hand-object relationships. Despite the use of a non-physiological neural network, simulations with the model revealed a range of putative properties of mirror neurons that suggest new neurophysiological experiments. (See Oztop and Arbib (2002) for examples and detailed analysis.)

Although MNS1 was constructed as a model of the development of mirror neurons in the monkey, it serves equally well as a model of the development of mirror neurons in the human infant. A major theme for future modeling, then, will be to clarify which aspects of human development are generic for primates, and which are specific to the human repertoire. In any case, the MNS1 model makes the crucial assumption that the grasps which the mirror system comes to recognize are already in the (monkey or human) infant's repertoire. But this raises the question of how grasps entered the repertoire. To simplify somewhat, the answer has two parts: (i) Children explore their environment and as their initially inept arm and hand movements successfully contact objects, they learn to reliably reproduce the successful grasps, with the repertoire being tuned through further experience. (ii) With more or less help from caregivers, infants come to recognize certain novel actions in terms of similarities with and differences from movements already in their repertoires, and on this basis learn to produce some version of these novel actions for themselves. Our Infant Learning to Grasp Model (ILGM; Oztop, Bradley and Arbib, to appear) strongly supports the hypothesis that grasps are acquired through experience as the infant learns how to conform the biomechanics of its hand to the shapes of the objects it encounters. However, limited space precludes presentation of this model here.

The classic papers on the mirror system for grasping in the monkey focus on a repertoire of grasps – such as the precision pinch and power grasp – that seem so basic that it is tempting to think of them as prewired. The crucial point of this section on modeling is that learning models such as ILGM and MNS1, and the data they address, make clear that *mirror neurons are not restricted to recognition of an innate set of actions but can be recruited to recognize and encode an expanding repertoire of novel actions.*

With this let us turn to human data. We mentioned in Section 1.2 that Broca's area, traditionally thought of as a speech area, has been shown by brain imaging studies to be active when humans both execute and observe grasps. This was first tested by two PET experiments (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Grafton et al., 1996) which compared brain activation when subjects observed the experimenter grasping an object against activation when subjects simply observed the object. Grasp observation significantly activated the superior temporal sulcus (STS), the inferior parietal lobule, and the inferior frontal gyrus (area 45). All activations were in the left hemisphere. The last area is of especial interest since areas 44 and 45 in the left hemisphere of the human constitute Broca's area. Such data certainly contribute to the growing body of indirect evidence that there is a mirror system for grasping that links Broca's area with regions in the inferior parietal lobule and STS. We have seen that the "minimal mirror system" for

grasping in the macaque includes mirror neurons in the parietal area PF (7b) as well as F5, and some not-quite-mirror neurons in the region STSa in the superior temporal sulcus. Thus in further investigation of the mirror system hypothesis it will be crucial to extend the F5 → Broca's area homology to examine the human homologues of PF and STSa as well. I will return to this issue in Section 7 (see Figure 6) and briefly review some of the relevant data from the rich and rapidly growing literature based on human brain imaging and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) inspired by the effort to probe the human mirror system and relate it to action recognition, imitation and language.

The claim is not that Broca's area is genetically preprogrammed for language, but rather that the development of a human child in a language community normally adapts this brain region to play a crucial (but not the only) role in language performance. Returning to the term “language readiness”, let me stress that the reliable linkage of brain areas to different aspects of language in normal speaking humans does not guarantee that language per se is “genetically encoded” in these regions. There is a neurology of writing even though writing was invented only a few thousand years ago.

## 4. Imitation

We have already discussed the mirror system for grasping as something shared between macaque and human, and thus adopt the hypothesis that this set of mechanisms was already in place in the common ancestor of monkey and human some 20 million years ago.<sup>12</sup> In this section we move from stage **S2**: A mirror system for grasping to stages **S3**: A simple imitation system for grasping and **S4**: A complex imitation system for grasping, and will argue that chimpanzees possess a capability for *simple* imitation that monkeys lack, but that humans have *complex* imitation whereas other primates do not. The ability to copy *single* actions is just the first step towards complex imitation which involves parsing a complex movement into more or less familiar pieces, and then performing the corresponding composite of (variations on) familiar actions. Arbib and Rizzolatti (1997) asserted that what makes a movement into an action is that it is associated with a goal, and that initiation of the movement is accompanied by the creation of an expectation that the goal will be met. Thus it is worth stressing that when I speak of imitation here, I speak of the imitation of a movement and its linkage to the goals it is meant to achieve. The action may thus vary from occasion to occasion depending on parametric variations in the goal. This is demonstrated by Byrne's (2003) description of a mountain gorilla preparing bundles of nettle leaves to eat.

Visalberghi & Fragaszy (2002) review data on attempts to observe imitation in monkeys, including their own studies of capuchin monkeys. They stress the huge difference between the major role that imitation plays in learning by human children, and the very limited role, if any, that imitation plays in social learning in monkeys. There is little evidence for vocal imitation in monkeys or apes (Hauser, 1996), but it is generally accepted that chimpanzees are capable of some forms of imitation (Tomasello & Call, 1997).

There is not space here to analyze all the relevant distinctions between imitation and other forms of learning, but one example may clarify my view: Voelkl and Huber (2000) had marmosets observe a demonstrator removing the lids from a series of plastic canisters to obtain a mealworm. When subsequently allowed access to the canisters,

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<sup>12</sup> Estimates for the timetable for hominid evolution (I use here those given by Gamble, 1994, his Figure 4.2) are 20 million years ago for the divergence of monkeys from the line that led to humans and apes, and 5 million years ago for the divergence of the hominid line from the line that led to modern apes.

marmosets that observed a demonstrator using its hands to remove the lids used only their hands. In contrast, marmosets that observed a demonstrator using its mouth also used their mouth to remove the lids. Voelkl and Huber (2000) suggest that this may be a case of true imitation in marmosets, but I would argue that it is a case of *stimulus enhancement*, apparent imitation resulting from directing attention to a particular object or part of the body or environment. This is to be distinguished from *emulation* (observing and attempting to reproduce results of another's actions without paying attention to details of the other's behavior) and *true imitation* which involves copying a novel, otherwise improbable action or some act which is outside the imitator's prior repertoire.

Myowa-Yamakoshi and Matsuzawa (1999) observed in a laboratory setting that chimpanzees typically took 12 trials to learn to "imitate" a behavior, and in doing so paid more attention to where the manipulated object was being directed, rather than the actual movements of the demonstrator. This involves the ability to learn novel actions which may involve using one or both hands to bring two objects into relationship, or to bring an object into relationship with the body.

Chimpanzees do use and make tools in the wild, with different tool traditions found in geographically separated groups of chimpanzees: Boesch and Boesch (1983) have observed chimpanzees in Tai National Park, Ivory Coast, using stone tools to crack nuts open, although Goodall has never seen chimpanzees do this in the Gombe in Tanzania. They crack harder-shelled nuts with stone hammers and stone anvils. The Tai chimpanzees live in a dense forest where suitable stones are hard to find. The stone anvils are stored in particular locations to which the chimpanzees continually return.<sup>13</sup> The nut-cracking technique is not mastered until adulthood. Tomasello (1999) comments that, over many years of observation, Boesch observed only two possible instances in which the mother *appeared* to be actively attempting to instruct her child, and that even in these cases it is unclear whether the mother had the goal of helping the young chimp learn to use the tool. We may contrast the long and laborious process of acquiring the nut-cracking technique with the rapidity with which human adults can acquire novel sequences, and the crucial role of caregivers in the development of this capacity for complex imitation. Meanwhile, reports abound of imitation in many species, including dolphins and orangutans, and even tool use in crows (Hunt and Gray, 2002). Thus, I accept that the demarcation between the capability for imitation of humans and non-humans is problematic. Nonetheless, I still think it is fair to claim that humans can master feats of imitation beyond those possible for other primates.

The ability to imitate has clear adaptive advantage in allowing creatures to transfer skills to their offspring, and thus could be selected for quite independently of any adaptation related to the later emergence of protolanguage. By the same token, the ability for "complex imitation could provide further selective advantage unrelated to language. However, complex imitation is central to human infants both in their increasing mastery of the physical and social world and in the close coupling of this mastery to the acquisition of language and behavior in a way that couples their (cf. Donald, 1998; Zukow-Goldring, Arbib, and Oztop, 2005). The child must go beyond simple imitation to acquire the phonological repertoire, words and basic "assembly skills" of its language community and this is one of the ways brain mechanisms supporting imitation were crucial to the emergence of language-ready *Homo sapiens*. If I then assume (i) that the common ancestor of monkeys and apes had no greater imitative ability than present-day

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<sup>13</sup> For more on "chimpanzee culture", see Whiten et al. (2001) and the Chimpanzee Cultures Website <http://culture.st-and.ac.uk:16080/chimp/> which gives access to an online database that describes the cultural variations in chimpanzee behavior,

monkeys (who possess, I suggest, stimulus enhancement rather than simple imitation), and (ii) that the ability for simple imitation shared by chimps and humans was also possessed by their common ancestor, but that (iii) only humans possess a talent for "complex" imitation, then I have established a case for the hypothesis that extension of the mirror system from *recognizing* single actions to *being able to copy* compound actions was the key innovation in the brains of our hominid ancestors that was relevant to language. And, more specifically, we have the hypotheses:

**Stage S3 Hypothesis:** Brain mechanisms supporting a simple imitation system – imitation of short novel sequences of object-directed actions through repeated exposure – for grasping developed in the 15 million year evolution from the common ancestor of monkeys and apes to the common ancestor of apes and humans; and

**Stage S4 Hypothesis:** Brain mechanisms supporting a complex imitation system – acquiring (longer) novel sequences of more abstract actions in a single trial – developed in the 5 million year evolution from the common ancestor of apes and humans along the hominid line that led, in particular, to *Homo sapiens*.

Now that we have introduced imitation, we can put the models of Section 3.2 in perspective by postulating the following stages prior to, during and building on the development of the mirror system for grasping in the infant:

- a. The child refines a crude map (superior colliculus) to make unstructured reach and “swipe” movements at objects; the grasp reflex occasionally yields a successful grasp.
- b. The child develops a set of grasps which succeed by kinesthetic, somatosensory criteria (ILGM).
- c. AIP develops as affordances of objects become learned in association with successful grasps. Grasping becomes visually guided; the grasp reflex disappears.
- d. The (grasp) mirror neuron system develops driven by visual stimuli relating hand and object generated by the actions (grasps) performed by the infant himself (MNS1). The child gains the ability to map other individual’s actions into his internal motor representation.
- f. Then the child acquires the ability to imitate, creating (internal) representations for novel actions that have been observed and developing an action prediction capability.

I suggest that stages a through d are much the same in monkey and human, but that stages e and f are rudimentary at best in monkeys, somewhat developed in chimps, and well-developed in human children (but not in infants). In terms of Figure 3, we might say that if MNS1 were augmented to have a population of mirror neurons which could acquire population codes for observed actions not yet in the repertoire of self-actions, then in stage e the mirror neurons would provide training for the canonical neurons, reversing the information flow seen in the MNS1 model. We note that this raises the further possibility that the human infant may come to recognize movements that are not only not within the repertoire but which never come to be within the repertoire. In this case, the cumulative development of action recognition may proceed to increase the breadth and subtlety of the range of actions that are recognizable but cannot be performed by children.

## 5. From Imitation to Protosign

The next posited transition, from stage **S4**: A complex imitation system for grasping to stage **S5**: Protosign, a manual-based communication system, takes us from imitation for the sake of instrumental goals to imitation for the sake of communication. Each stage builds on, yet is not simply reducible to, the previous stage.

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and shows behavior distributions across the sites in Africa where long-term studies of chimpanzees have been conducted in the wild.

I argue that the combination of the abilities (S5a) to engage in pantomime and (S5b) to make conventional gestures to disambiguate pantomime yielded a brain which could (S5) support "protosign", a manual-based communication system which broke through the fixed repertoire of primate vocalizations to yield an open repertoire of communicative gestures.

It is important to stress that communication is about far more than grasping. To pantomime the flight of a bird you might move your hand up and down in a way that indicates the flapping of a wing. Your pantomime uses movements of the hand (and arm and body) to imitate movement other than hand movements. You can pantomime an object either by miming a typical action by or with the object, or by tracing out the characteristic shape of the object.

The transition to pantomime does seem to involve a genuine neurological change. Mirror neurons for grasping in the monkey will fire only if the monkey sees *both* the hand movement and the object to which it is directed (Umiltà et al., 2001). A grasping movement that is not made in the presence of a suitable object, or is not directed toward that object, will not elicit mirror neuron firing. By contrast, in pantomime, the observer sees the movement in isolation and *infers* (i) what non-hand movement is being mimicked by the hand movement, and (ii) the goal or object of the action. This is an evolutionary change of key relevance to language readiness. Imitation is the generic attempt to reproduce movements performed by another, whether to master a skill or simply as part of a social interaction. By contrast, pantomime is performed with the intention of getting the observer to think of a specific action, object or event. It is essentially communicative in its nature. The imitator observes; the panto-mimic intends to be observed.

As Stokoe (2001) and others emphasize, the power of pantomime is that it provides open-ended communication that works without prior instruction or convention. However (and I shall return to this issue at the end of this section), even signs of modern signed language which resemble pantomimes are conventionalized and are thus distinct from pantomimes. Pantomime *per se* is not a form of protolanguage; rather it provides a rich scaffolding for the emergence of protosign.

All this assumes, rather than provides an explanation, for LR4, the transition from making praxic movement, e.g., those involved in the immediate satisfaction of some appetitive or aversive goal, to those intended by the utterer to have a particular effect on the recipient. I tentatively offer:

**The Intended Communication Hypothesis:** The ability to imitate combined with the ability to observe the effect of such imitation on conspecifics to support a migration of closed species-specific gestures supported by other brain regions to become the core of an open class of communicative gestures.

Darwin [1872/1965] observed long ago, across a far wider range of mammalian species than just the primates, that the facial expressions of conspecifics provide valuable cues to their likely reaction to certain courses of behavior (a rich complex summarized as "emotional state"). Moreover, the F5 region contains orofacial cells as well as manual cells. This suggests a progression from control of emotional expression by systems that exclude F5 to the extension of F5's mirror capacity from manual to orofacial movement and then, via its posited capacity (achieved by stage S3) for simple imitation, to support the imitation of emotional expressions. This would then provide the ability to affect the behavior of others by, e.g., *appearing* angry. This would in turn provide the evolutionary opportunity to generalize the ability of F5 activity to affect the behavior of conspecifics from species-specific vocalizations to a general ability to use the imitation of behavior (as distinct from praxic behavior itself) as a means to influence

others.<sup>14</sup> This in turn makes possible reciprocity by a process of backward chaining where the influence is not so much on the praxis of the other as on the exchange of information. With this, the transition described by LR4 (intended communication) has been achieved in tandem with the achievement and increasing sophistication of LR2 (Symbolization).

A further critical change (labeled 5b above) emerges from the fact that in pantomime it might be hard to, for example, distinguish a movement signifying “bird” from one meaning “flying”. This inability to adequately convey shades of meaning using “natural” pantomime would favor the invention of gestures which could in some way disambiguate which of its associated meanings was intended. Note that whereas a pantomime can freely use any movement that might evoke the intended observation in the mind of the observer, a disambiguating gesture must be conventionalized. (As ahistorical support for this<sup>15</sup>, note that AIRPLANE is signed in ASL, American Sign Language, with tiny repeated movements of a specific handshape, while FLY is signed by moving the same handshape along an extended trajectory [Supalla and Newport, 1978].) This use of non-pantomimic gestures requires extending the use of the mirror system to attend to a whole new class of hand movements. However, this does not seem to require a biological change beyond that limned above for pantomime.

As pantomime begins to use hand movements to mime different degrees of freedom (as in miming the flying of a bird), a dissociation begins to emerge. The mirror system for the pantomime (based on movements of face, hand, etc.) is now different from the recognition system for the action that is pantomimed, and – as in the case of flying – the action may not even be in the human action repertoire. However, the system is still able to exploit the praxic recognition system because an animal or hominid must observe much about the environment that is relevant to its actions, but is not in its own action repertoire. Nonetheless, this dissociation now underwrites the emergence of actions which are defined only by their communicative impact, not by their praxic goals.

Protosign may lose the ability of the original pantomime to elicit a response from someone who has not seen it before. However, the price is worth paying in that the simplified form, once agreed upon by the community, allows more rapid communication with less neural effort. One may see analogies in the history of Chinese characters. The character  (san) may not seem particularly pictorial, but if (following the “etymology” of Vaccari and Vaccari, 1961), we see it as a simplification of a picture of three mountains, , via such intermediate forms as , then we have no trouble seeing the simplified character  as meaning “mountain”.<sup>16</sup> The important point here for our hypothesis is that, while such a “picture history” may provide a valuable crutch to the learner, with sufficient practice the crutch is thrown away, and in normal reading and writing, the link between  and its meaning is direct, with no need to invoke an intermediate representation of .

In the same way, I suggest that pantomime is a valuable crutch for acquiring a modern sign language, but that even signs which resemble pantomimes are conventionalized and are thus distinct from pantomimes.<sup>17</sup> Interestingly,

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
<sup>14</sup> To anticipate an argument developed below, I argue that this initially (Stage S5) applied primarily to oral and facial gestures, and only later came increasingly to exploit vocal gestures.

<sup>15</sup> I say “ahistorical” because such signs are part of a modern human language rather than holdovers from protosign. Nonetheless, they exemplify the mixture of iconicity and convention that, I claim, distinguishes protosign from pantomime.

<sup>16</sup> Of course, relatively few Chinese characters are so pictographic in origin. For a fuller account of the integration of semantic and phonetic elements in Chinese characters (and a comparison with Sumerian logograms) see Chapter 3 of Coulmas (2003).

<sup>17</sup> Of course, those signs which most clearly resemble pantomimes will be easier for the non-signer to recognize, just as certain Chinese characters are easier for the novice to recognize. Shannon Casey (personal communication) notes that moving the hands

Emmorey (2002, Chapter 9) discusses studies of signers using ASL which show a dissociation between the neural systems involved in sign language and those involved in conventionalized gesture and pantomime. Corina et al. (1992b) reported left-hemisphere dominance for producing ASL signs, but no laterality effect when subjects had to produce symbolic gestures (e.g., waving good-bye or thumbs-up). Other studies report patients with left-hemisphere damage who exhibited sign language impairments but well-preserved conventional gesture and pantomime. Corina et al. (1992a) described patient WL with damage to left hemisphere perisylvian regions. WL exhibited poor sign language comprehension and production. Nonetheless, could produce stretches of pantomime and tended to substitute pantomimes for signs, even when the pantomime required more complex movement. Emmorey sees such data as providing neurological evidence that signed languages consist of linguistic gestures and not simply elaborate pantomimes.



**Figure 4:** The bidirectional sign relation links words and concepts. The top row concerns Phonological Form which may relate to signed language as much as to spoken language. The bottom row concerns Cognitive Form and includes the recognition of objects and actions. Phonological Form is present only in humans while Cognitive Form is present in both monkeys and humans. The Mirror System Hypothesis hypothesizes that there is a mirror system for words, but (contra Hurford 2003a) there may not be a mirror system for concepts

Figure 4 is based on a scheme offered by Arbib (2004) in response to Hurford's (2003a) critique of the Mirror System Hypothesis. Hurford makes the crucial point that we must (in the spirit of Saussure) distinguish the "sign" from the "signified". In the figure, we distinguish the "neural representation of the sign" (top row) from the "neural representation of the signified" (bottom row). The top row of the figure makes explicit the result of the progression within the Mirror System Hypothesis of mirror systems for:

- i) grasping and manual praxic actions.
- ii) pantomime of grasping and manual praxic actions.
- iii) pantomime of actions outside the panto-mimic's own behavioral repertoire (e.g., flapping the arms to mime a flying bird).


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in space to represent actions involving people interacting with people, animals, or other objects is found in signed languages in verbs called "spatial verbs" or "verbs of motion and location". These verbs can be used with handshapes to represent people or objects called "semantic classifiers" and "size and shape specifiers" (Supalla, 1986; see p.196 for a description of these classifiers and p. 211 for figures of them). Thus, to describe giving someone a cup, the ASL signer may either use the standard GIVE handshape (palm up with fingertips and thumb tip touching), or use an open curved handshape with the fingertips and thumb tip apart and the palm to the side (as if holding a cup). Similarly, to describe giving someone a thick book, the signer can use a handshape with the palm facing up, fingertips pointing outward and thumb also pointing outward with about an inch space between the thumb and fingertips (as if holding a book). In her own research Casey (2003) has found that hearing subjects with

- iv) conventional gestures used to formalize and disambiguate pantomime (e.g., to distinguish "bird" from "flying")
- v) protosign, comprising conventionalized manual (and related oro-facial) communicative gestures

However, I disagree with Hurford’s suggestion that there is a mirror system for all concepts – actions, objects and more besides – which links the perception and action related to each concept. In schema theory (Arbib 1981, 2003a), I distinguish between *perceptual schemas* which determine whether a given "domain of interaction" is present in the environment and provide parameters concerning the current relationship of the organism with that domain, and *motor schemas* which provide the control systems which can be coordinated to effect a wide variety of actions. Recognizing an object (an apple, say) may be linked to many different courses of action (to place the apple in one's shopping basket; to place the apple in the bowl at home; to peel the apple; to eat the apple; to discard a rotten apple, etc.). In this list, some items are apple-specific whereas other invoke generic schemas for reaching and grasping. Such considerations led me to separate perceptual and motor schemas – a given action may be invoked in a wide variety of circumstances; a given perception may, as part of a larger assemblage, precede many courses of action. Thus I reject the notion of a mirror system for concepts. Only rarely (as in the case of certain basic actions, or certain expressions of emotion) will the perceptual and motor schemas be integrated into a "mirror schema". I do not see a "concept" as corresponding to one word, but rather to a graded set of activations of the schema network.

But if this is the case, does a mirror system for protosigns (and, later, for the words and utterances of a language) really yield the LR3 form of the Mirror Property, that what counts for the sender must count for the receiver? Actually, it only yields half of this directly: the recognition that the action of the observed protosigner is their version of one of the conventional gestures in the observer’s repertoire. The claim, then, is that the LR3 form of the Mirror Property – that what counts for the sender must count for the receiver – does not result from the evolution of the F5 mirror system *in and of itself* to support communicative gestures as well as praxic actions, but rather because this evolution occurs within the neural context that links the execution and observation of an action to the creature’s planning of its own actions and interpretations of the actions of others (Figure 5). These linkages extract more or less coherent patterns from the creature’s experience of the effects of its own actions as well as the consequences of actions by others. Similarly, execution and observation of a communicative action must be linked to the creature’s planning and interpretations of communication with others in relation to the ongoing behaviors which provide the significance of the communicative gestures involved.




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no knowledge of a signed language do produce gestures resembling classifiers. Stokoe (2001, pp.188-191) relates the use of shape classifiers in ASL to the use of shape classifiers in spoken Native American languages.

**Figure 5.** The perceptuomotor coding for both observation and execution contained in the mirror system for manual actions in the monkey is linked to “conceptual systems” for interpretation and planning of such actions. The interpretation and planning systems themselves do not have the mirror property save through their linkage to the actual mirror system.

## 6. The Emergence of Protospeech

### 6.1. *The Path to Protospeech is Indirect*

I claim neither that stage S5 (protosign) was completed before Stage S6 (protospeech) began nor that protosign attained the status of a full language prior to the emergence of early forms of protospeech, but rather that early protosign provided a necessary scaffolding for the emergence of protospeech.

Manual gesture certainly appears to be more conducive to iconic representation than oral gesture. The main argument of Section 5 was that the use of pantomime made it easy to acquire a core vocabulary, while the discovery of a growing stock of conventional signs (or sign modifiers) to mark important distinctions then created a culture in which the use of arbitrary gestures would increasingly augment and ritualize (without entirely supplanting) the use of pantomime. Once an organism has an iconic gesture, it can both modulate that gesture and/or symbolize it (non-iconically) by “simply” associating a vocalization with it. Once the association had been learned, the “scaffolding” gesture (like the pantomime that supported its conventionalization, or the caricature that supports the initial understanding of some Chinese ideograms) could be dropped to leave a symbol that need have no remaining iconic relation to its referent, even if the indirect associative relationship can be recalled on some occasions. One open question is the extent to which protosign must be in place before this scaffolding can effectively support the development of protospeech. Since there is no direct mapping of sign (with its use of concurrency and signing space) to phoneme sequences, I think that this development is far more of a breakthrough than may at first sight appear.

I have separated S6, the evolution of protospeech, from S5, the evolution of protosign, to stress the point that the role of F5 in grounding the evolution of a protolanguage system would work just as well if we and all our ancestors had been deaf. However, primates do have a rich auditory system which contributes to species survival in many ways of which communication is just one (Ghazanfar, 2003). The protolanguage perception system could thus build upon the existing auditory mechanisms in the move to derive protospeech. However, it appears that considerable evolution of the vocal-motor system was needed to yield the flexible vocal apparatus that distinguishes humans from other primates. MacNeilage (1998) offers an argument for how the mechanism for producing consonant-vowel alternations en route to a flexible repertoire of syllabus might have evolved from the cyclic mandibular alternations of eating, but offers no clue as to what might have linked such a process to the expression of meaning. This problem is discussed much further in Arbib (2004a).

Kohler et al. (2002) studied mirror neurons for actions which are accompanied by characteristic sounds, and found that a subset of these are activated by the sound of the action (e.g., breaking a peanut in half) as well as sight of the action. Does this suggest that protospeech mediated by the F5 homologue in the hominid brain could have evolved without the scaffolding provided by protosign? My answer is negative for two reasons. (i) I have argued that imitation is crucial to grounding pantomime in which a movement is performed in the absence of the object for which such a movement would constitute part of a praxic action. However, the sounds studied by Kohler et al.

(2002) cannot be created in the absence of the object and there is no evidence that monkeys can use their vocal apparatus to mimic the sounds they have heard. I would further argue that the limited number and congruence of these “auditory mirror neurons” is more consistent with the view that manual gesture is primary in the early stages of the evolution of language readiness, with audio-motor neurons laying the basis for later extension of protosign to protospeech.

Complementing earlier studies on hand neurons in macaque F5, Ferrari et al. (2003) studied mouth motor neurons in F5 and showed that about one-third of them also discharge when the monkey observes another individual performing mouth actions. The majority of these “mouth mirror neurons” become active during the execution and observation of mouth actions related to ingestive functions such as grasping, sucking or breaking food. Another population of mouth mirror neurons also discharges during the execution of ingestive actions, but the most effective visual stimuli in triggering them are communicative mouth gestures (e.g., lip smacking) – one action becomes associated with a whole performance of which one part involves similar movements. This fits with the hypothesis that neurons learn to associate patterns of neural firing rather than being committed to learn specifically pigeonholed categories of data. Thus a potential mirror neuron is in no way committed to become a mirror neuron in the strict sense, even though it may be more likely to do so than otherwise. The observed communicative actions (with the effective executed action for different “mirror neurons” in parentheses) include lip-smacking (sucking, sucking and lip smacking); lips protrusion (grasping with lips, lips protrusion, lip smacking, grasping and chewing); tongue protrusion (reaching with tongue); teeth-chatter (grasping); and lips/tongue protrusion (grasping with lips and reaching with tongue; grasping). We thus see that the communicative gestures (effective observed actions) are a long way from the sort of vocalizations that occur in speech.

Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) stated that “This new use of vocalization [in speech] necessitated its skillful control, a requirement that could not be fulfilled by the ancient emotional vocalization centers. This new situation was most likely the ‘cause’ of the emergence of human Broca’s area.” I would now rather say that *Homo habilis* and even more so *Homo erectus* had a “proto-Broca’s area” based on an F5-like precursor mediating communication by manual and oro-facial gesture which made possible a process of collateralization whereby this “proto” Broca’s area gained primitive control of the vocal machinery, thus yielding increased skill and openness in vocalization, moving from the fixed repertoire of primate vocalizations to the unlimited (open) range of vocalizations exploited in speech. Speech apparatus and brain regions could then co-evolve to yield the configuration seen in modern *Homo sapiens*.

Corballis (2003) argues that there may have been a single-gene mutation producing a “dextral” allele, which created a strong bias toward right-handedness and left-cerebral dominance for language at some point in hominid evolution. He then suggests that the “speciation event” that distinguished *Homo sapiens* from other large-brained hominids may have been a switch from a predominantly gestural to a predominantly vocal form of language. By contrast, I would argue that there was no one distinctive speciation event, and that the process whereby communication for most humans became predominantly vocal was not a switch but was “cultural” and cumulative.

## 7. The Inventions of Languages

The divergence of the Romance languages from Latin took about one thousand years. The divergence of the Indo-European languages to form the immense diversity of Hindi, German, Italian, English, etc., took about 6,000 years (Dixon, 1997). How can we imagine what has changed since the emergence of *Homo sapiens* some 200,000

years ago? Or in 5,000,000 years of prior hominid evolution? I claim that the first *Homo sapiens* were language-ready but did not have language in the modern sense. Rather, my hypothesis is that stage S7, the transition from protolanguage to language, is the culmination of manifold discoveries in the history of mankind:

In Section 2, I asserted that in much of protolanguage, a complete communicative act involved a unitary utterance, the use of a single symbol, formed as a sequence of gestures, whose component gestures – whether manual or vocal – had no independent meaning. Unitary utterances such as "grooflook" or "koomzash" might have encoded quite complex descriptions such as "The alpha male has killed a meat animal and now the tribe has a chance to feast together. Yum, yum!" or commands such as "Take your spear and go around the other side of that animal and we will have a better chance together of being able to kill it". On this view, "protolanguage" grew by adding arbitrary novel unitary utterances to convey *complex but frequently important* situations, and it was a major later discovery en route to language as we now understand it that one could gain expressive power by *fractionating* such utterances into shorter utterances conveying components of the scene or command (cf. Wray, 1998, 2000). Put differently, the utterances of prelanguage were more akin to the "calls" of modern primates – such as the "leopard call" of the vervet monkey which is emitted by a monkey who has seen a leopard and which triggers the appropriate escape behavior in other monkeys – than to sentences as defined in a language like English, but they differed *crucially* from the primate calls in that new utterances could be invented and acquired through learning within a community, rather than emerging only through biological evolution. Thus the set of such unitary utterances was open, whereas the set of calls was closed.

The following, hypothetical but instructive, example is similar to examples offered at greater length by Wray (1998, 2000) to suggest how the fractionation of unitary utterances might occur (and see Kirby, 2000, for a related computer simulation): Imagine that a tribe has two unitary utterances concerning fire which, by chance, contain similar substrings which become regularized so that for the first time there is a sign for "fire". Now the two original utterances are modified by replacing the similar substrings by the new regularized substring. Eventually, some tribe members regularize the complementary gestures in the first string to get a sign for "burns"; later, others regularize the complementary gestures in the second string to get a sign for "cooks meat". However, because of the arbitrary origin of the sign for "fire", the placement of the gestures that have come to denote "burns" relative to "fire" differs greatly from those for "cooks meat" relative to "fire". It thus requires a further invention to regularize the placement of the gestures in both utterances – and in the process words are crystallized at the same time as the protosyntax which combines them. Clearly, such fractionation could apply to protosign as well as to protospeech.

Other mechanisms could also produce composite structures. For example, a tribe might, over the generations, developed different signs for "sour apple", "ripe apple", "sour plum", "ripe plum", etc., but not have signs for "sour" and "ripe" even though the distinction is behaviorally important. Thus  $2n$  signs are needed to name  $n$  kinds of fruit. Occasionally, someone will eat a piece of sour fruit by mistake and make a characteristic face and intake of breath when doing so. Eventually, some genius pioneers the innovation of getting a conventionalized variant of this gesture accepted as the sign for "sour" by the community, thus extending the protolanguage.<sup>18</sup> A step towards language is

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<sup>18</sup> I use the word "genius" advisedly. I believe that much work on language evolution has been crippled by the inability to imagine that things we take for granted were in no way a priori obvious, or to see that current generalities were by no means easy to discern in the particularities that they embrace. Consider, for example, that Archimedes (c.287-212 BCE) had the essential idea of the integral calculus, but that it took almost 2000 years before Newton (1642-1727) and Leibniz (1646-1716) found notations

taken when another genius gets people to use the sign for “sour” + the sign for “ripe X” to replace the sign for “sour X” for each kind X of fruit. This innovation allows new users of the protolanguage to simplify learning fruit names, since now only  $n+1$  names are required for the basic vocabulary, rather than  $2n$  as before. More to the point, if a new fruit is discovered, only one name need be invented rather than two. I stress that the invention of “sour” is a great discovery in and of itself. It might take hundreds of such discoveries distributed across centuries or more before someone could recognize the commonality across all these constructions and thus invent the precursor of what we would now call adjectives.<sup>19</sup>

The latter example is meant to indicate how a sign for “sour” could be added to the protolanguage vocabulary with no appeal to an underlying “adjective mechanism”. Instead, one would posit that the features of language emerged by bricolage (tinkering) which added many features as “patches” to a protolanguage, with general “rules” emerging both consciously and unconsciously only as generalizations could be imposed on, or discerned in, a population of ad hoc mechanisms. On this account there was no sudden transition from unitary utterances to an elaborate language with a rich syntax and compositional semantics; no point at which one could say of a tribe “Until now they used protolanguage but henceforth they use language.” Rather, languages emerged through a process of bricolage (tinkering) which yielded many novelties to handle special problems of communication, with a variety of generalizations amplifying the power of groups of inventions by unifying them to provide expressive tools of greatly extended range.

To proceed further, I need to distinguish two “readings” of a case frame like Grasp(Leo, raisin), as an action-object frame and as a verb-argument structure. I chart the transition as follows:

(i) As an *action-object frame*, Grasp(Leo, raisin) represents the perception that Leo is grasping a raisin. Here the action “grasp” involves two “objects”, one the “grasper” Leo and the other the “graspee”, the “raisin”. Clearly, the monkey has the perceptual capability to recognize such a situation<sup>20</sup> and enter a brain state which represents it, with that representation distributed across a number of brain regions. Indeed, in introducing principle LR5 (From Hierarchical Structuring to Temporal Ordering) I noted that the ability to translate a hierarchical conceptual structure into a temporally ordered structure of actions is apparent whenever an animal takes in the nature of a visual scene and produces appropriate behavior. *But to have such a capability does not entail the ability to communicate in a way that reflects these structures.* It is crucial to note here the extension of the mirror system concept to include recognition not only of the action (mediated by F5) but also of the object (mediated by IT [inferotemporal cortex]). This reflects the crucial understanding gained from Figure 2 that the canonical activity of F5 already exhibits a congruence between the affordances of an object (mediated by the dorsal stream) and the nature of the object (as recognized by IT and elaborated upon in prefrontal cortex, PFC, in a process of “action-oriented perception”). In the same way, the activity of mirror neurons does not rest solely upon the parietal recognition (in PF, Figure 3) of the hand motion and the object's affordances (AIP) but also on the “semantics” of the object as extracted by IT. In the

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that could express the generality implicit in his specific examples, and thus unleash an explosion of mathematical innovation. I contend that language, like mathematics, has evolved culturally by such fits and starts.

<sup>19</sup> Indeed, adjectives are not the “natural category” they may appear to be. As Dixon (1997, pp.142 et seq.) observes, there are two kinds of adjective classes across human languages: (i) An open class with hundreds of members (as in English). (ii) A small closed class. Languages with small adjective classes are found in every continent except Europe. Igbo, from west Africa, has just 8 adjectives: *large* and *small*; *black*, *dark* and *white*, *light*; *new* and *old*; and *good* and *bad*. Concepts which refer to physical properties tend to be placed in the verb class (e.g., “the stone heavies”) and words referring to human propensities tend to be nouns (e.g., “she has cleverness”).

spirit of Figure 2, I suggest that this semantics is relayed to F5 via PFC and thence through AIP and PF to affect there the mirror neurons as well as the canonical neurons.

(ii) My suggestion is that at least the immediate hominid precursors of *Homo sapiens* would have been able to perceive a large variety of action-object frames, and to form distinctive gestures or a vocalization to draw aspects of this event to the attention of another tribe member, but that the vocalization used would be in general a unitary utterance which need not have involved separate lexical entries for the action or the objects. However, the ability to symbolize more and more situations would have required the creation of a “symbol toolkit” of meaningless elements<sup>21</sup> from which an open ended class of symbols could be generated.

(iii) As a verb-argument structure, Grasp(Leo, raisin) is expressed in English in a sentence such as "Leo grasps the raisin", with "grasps" the verb, and "Leo" and "raisin" the arguments. I hypothesize that Stage S7 was grounded in the development of precursors to verb-argument structure, using vocalizations that were decomposable into "something like a verb" and two somethings which would be "something like nouns".<sup>22</sup> This is the crucial step in the transition from protolanguage to human language as we know it. Abstract symbols are grounded (but more and more indirectly) in action-oriented perception; members of a community may acquire the use of these new symbols (the crucial distinction here is with the fixed repertoire of primate calls) by imitating their use by others; and, crucially, these symbols can be compounded in novel combinations to communicate about novel situations for which no agreed-upon unitary communicative symbol exists.

To continue with the bricolage theme, much of this would at first have developed on an ad hoc basis with variations on a few basic themes, rather than on the emergence of broad categories like “noun” or “verb” with general rule-like procedures to combine them in the phonological expression of cognitive form. It might have taken many, many millennia for people to discover syntax and semantics in the sense of gaining immense expressive power by “going recursive” with a relatively limited set of strategies for compounding and marking utterances. As a language emerged, it would come to include mechanisms to express kinship structures and technologies of the tribes, and these cultural products would themselves be expanded by the increased effectiveness of transmission from generation to generation that the growing power of language made possible. Evans (in press) supports this view by surveying a series of linguistic structures – pronouns reflecting moiety-type categories, subsections, moiety lects, and systems of triangular kin terms – which are common in Australian aboriginal tribes but are unknown elsewhere. On this basis, we see such linguistic structures as historical products reflecting the impact of various processes of “cultural selection” on emerging structure.

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<sup>20</sup> Leaving aside the fact that the monkey probably does not know that Leo’s name is “Leo”.

<sup>21</sup> Not all the symbols need be meaningless. Thus some signs of a signed language can be recognized as conventionalized pantomime, and some Chinese characters can be recognized as conventionalized pictures. But we have already noted that relatively few Chinese characters are pictographic in origin. Similarly, many signs have no link to pantomime. As Coulmas (2003) shows us in analyzing writing systems, but the point holds equally well for speech and sign, the mixture of economy of expression and increasing range of expression leads to more and more of a symbol being built up from meaningless components.

<sup>22</sup> Having stressed above that adjectives are not a “natural category”, I hasten to add that I do not regard verbs or nouns as natural categories either. What I do assert here is that every human language must find a way to express the content of action-object frames. The vast variety of these frames can yield many different forms of expression across human languages. I view linguistic universals as based on universals of communication which take into account the processing loads of perception and production, rather than as universals of autonomous syntax. Thus, in emphasizing verb-argument structures in the form familiar from English, I am opting for economy of exposition rather than for further illustration of the diversities of human language.

If one starts with unitary utterances then symbols that correspond to statements like "Take your spear and go around the other side of that animal and we will have a better chance together of being able to kill it" must each be important enough or occur often enough for the tribe to agree on a symbol (e.g., arbitrary string of phonemes) for each one to replace an elaborate pantomime with a conventionalized utterance of protosign or protospeech. Discovering that separate names could be assigned to each actor, object and action would require many words instead of one to express such an utterance. However, once the number of utterances with overlap reaches a critical level, economies of word learning would accrue from building utterances from "reusable" components (cf. the "Wray-Kirby" and "sour fruit" scenarios above). Separating verbs from nouns lets one learn  $m+n+p$  words (or less if the same noun can fill two roles) to be able to form  $m*n*p$  of the most basic utterances. Of course, not all of these combinations will be useful, but the advantage is that new utterances can now be coined "on the fly" rather than each acquiring group mastery of a novel utterance.

Nowak et al (2000) analyzed conditions under which a population which had two genes – one for unitary utterances and one for fractionated utterances – would converge to a situation in which one gene or the other (and thus one type of language or the other) would predominate. But I feel that this misses the whole point: (i) It assumes that there is a genetic basis for this alternative, whereas I believe the basis is historical, without requiring genetic change. (ii) It postulates that the alternatives already exist. I believe it is necessary to offer a serious analysis of how both unitary and fractionated utterances came to exist, and of the *gradual process* of accumulating changes that led from the predominance of the former to the predominance of the latter. (iii) Moreover, it is not a matter of either/or – modern languages have a predominance of fractionated utterances but make wide use of unitary utterances as well.

The spread of these innovations rested on the ability of other humans not only to imitate the new actions and compounds of actions demonstrated by the innovators, but also to do so in a way which related increasingly general classes of symbolic behavior to the classes, events, behaviors and relationships that they were to represent. Indeed, consideration of the spatial basis for "prepositions" may help show how visumotor coordination underlies some aspects of language (cf. Talmy, 2000), while the immense variation in the use of corresponding prepositions even in closely related languages like English and Spanish shows how the basic functionally grounded semantic-syntactic correspondences have been overlaid by a multitude of later innovations and borrowings.


The Transition to *Homo sapiens* thus may have involved "language amplification" through increased speech ability coupled with the ability to name certain actions and objects separately; then the ability to create a potentially unlimited set of verb-argument structures and the ability to compound those structures in diverse ways. Recognition of hierarchical structure rather than mere sequencing provided the bridge to constituent analysis in language.

## **8. Towards a Neurolinguistics "Beyond the Mirror"**

Most of the stages of our evolutionary story are not to be seen so much as replacing "old" capabilities of the ancestral brain with new ones, but rather as extending those capabilities by embedding them in an enriched system. Thus, I now build on our account of the evolution of the language-ready brain to offer a synchronic account of the "layered capabilities" of the modern adult human brain.

Aboitiz and García (1997) offer a neuroanatomical perspective on the evolutionary origin of the language areas in the human brain by analyzing possible homologies between language areas of the human brain and areas of the monkey brain which may offer clues as to the structures of the brains of our ancestors of 20 million years ago. Arbib

and Bota (2003) summarize the Aboitiz-García and Mirror System hypotheses and summarize other relevant data on homologies between different cortical areas in macaque and human to ground further work on an evolutionary account of the readiness of the human brain for language.



**Figure 6.** Extending the FARS model to include the mirror system for grasping and the language system evolved "atop" this. Note that this simple figure neither asserts nor denies that the extended mirror system for grasping and the language-supporting system are anatomically separable, nor does it address issues of lateralization. (From Arbib and Bota, 2003.)

Figure 6 is the diagram Arbib and Bota (2003) used to synthesize lessons about the language mechanisms of the human brain, extending a sketch for a "Mirror Neurolinguistics" (Arbib, 2001b). This figure was designed to elicit further modeling; it does not have the status of fully implemented models such as the FARS and MNS1 models whose relation to, and prediction of, empirical results has been probed through computer simulation.

To start our analysis of Figure 6, note that an over-simple analysis of praxis, action understanding, and language production might focus on the following parallel parieto-frontal interactions:

- I. object → AIP → F5<sub>canonical</sub>      praxis
- II. action → PF → F5<sub>mirror</sub>      action understanding
- III. scene → Wernicke's → Broca's      language production

The data on patients AT and DF reviewed in Section 3.1 showed a dissociation between the praxic use of size information (parietal) and the "declaration" of that information either verbally or through pantomime (inferotemporal). DF had a lesion allowing signals to flow from V1 towards posterior parietal cortex (PP) but not from V1 to inferotemporal cortex (IT). DF could preshape accurately when reaching to grasp an object, even though she was unable to declare, either verbally or in pantomime, the visual parameters that guided the preshape. By contrast, AT had a bilateral posterior parietal lesion. AT could use her hand to pantomime the size of a cylinder, but could not preshape appropriately when asked to grasp it. This suggests the following scheme

IV. Parietal “affordances” → preshape

V. IT “perception of object” → pantomime or verbally describe size

i.e., one cannot pantomime or verbalize an affordance; but rather one needs a “recognition of the object” (IT) to which attributes can be attributed before one can express them. Recall now the path shown in Figure 2 from IT to AIP both directly and via PFC. We postulate that similar pathways link IT and PF. We show neither of these pathways in Figure 6, but rather show how this pathway might in the human brain not only take the form needed for praxic actions but also be “reflected” into a pathway that supports the recognition of communicative manual actions. We would then see the “extended PF” of this pathway as functionally integrated with the posterior part of Brodmann’s area 22, or area Tpt (temporo-parietal) as defined by Galaburda and Sanides (1980). Indeed, lesion-based views of Wernicke’s area may include not only the posterior part of Tpt but also (in whole or in part) areas in human cortex that correspond to macaque PF (see Arbib & Bota, 2003, for further details). In this way, we see Wernicke’s area as combining capabilities for recognizing protosign and protospeech to support a language-ready brain that is capable of learning signed languages as readily as spoken languages. Finally, we note that Bota and Arbib (2003) responded to the analysis of Aboitiz and García (1997) by including a number of working memories crucial to the linkage of visual scene perception, motor planning, and the production and recognition of language. However, they did not provide data on the integration of these diverse working memory systems into their anatomical scheme.

In building upon Figure 6, we need to bear in mind the definition of “complex imitation” as the ability to recognize another’s performance as a set of familiar movements and then repeat them, but also to recognize when such a performance combines novel actions which can be approximated by (i.e., more or less crudely be imitated by) variants of actions already in the repertoire. Moreover, in discussing the FARS model in Section 3.1, I noted that the interactions shown in Figure 2 are supplemented in the computer implementation of the model by code representing the role of the basal ganglia in administering sequences of actions, and that Bischoff-Grethe et al. (2003) model the possible role of the basal ganglia in interactions with the pre-SMA in sequence learning. Thus I agree with Visalberghi & Frigaszy’s (2002, p. 495) suggestion that “[mirror] neurons provide a neural substrate for segmenting a stream of action into discrete elements matching those in the observer’s repertoire, as Byrne (1999) has suggested in connection with his string-parsing theory of imitation”, while adding that the success of complex imitation requires that the appropriate motor system be linked to appropriate working memories (as in Figure 6) as well as to pre-SMA and basal ganglia (not shown in Figure 6) to extract and execute the overall structure of the compound action (which may be sequential, or a more general coordinated control program [Arbib, 2003]). Lieberman (2002) emphasizes that the roles of Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas must be seen in relation to larger neocortical and subcortical circuits. He cites data from studies of Broca’s aphasia, Parkinson’s disease, focal brain damage, etc., to demonstrate the importance of the basal ganglia in sequencing the elements that constitute a complete motor act, syntactic process, or thought process. Hanakawa et al. (2002) investigated numerical, verbal, and spatial types of nonmotor mental-operation tasks. Parts of the posterior frontal cortex, consistent with the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and the rostral part of the dorsolateral premotor cortex (PMdr), were active during all three tasks. They also observed activity in the posterior parietal cortex and cerebellar hemispheres during all three tasks. fMRI showed that PMdr activity during the mental-operation tasks was localized in the depths of the superior precentral

sulcus, which substantially overlapped the region active during complex finger movements and was located dorsomedial to the presumptive frontal eye fields.

Such papers are part of the rapidly growing literature which relates human brain mechanisms for action recognition, imitation and language. A full review of such literature is beyond the scope of the target article but let me first list a number of key articles – Binkofski et al. (1999), Decety et al. (1997), Fadiga et al. (2002), Grezes et al. (1998), Grezes and Decety (2001, 2002), Hamzei et al. (2002), Heiser et al. (2003), Hickok et al. (1998), Iacoboni et al. (1999, 2001) and Floel et al. 2003 – and then briefly describe a few others:

Koski et al. (2002) used fMRI to assess the effect of explicit action goals on neural activity during imitation. Their results support the hypothesis that areas relevant to motor preparation and motor execution are tuned to coding goal-oriented actions and are in keeping with single-cell recordings revealing that neurons in area F5 of the monkey brain represent goal-directed aspects of actions. Grezes et al. (2003) used event-related fMRI to investigate where in the human brain activation can be found that reflects both canonical and mirror neuronal activity. They found activation in the intraparietal and ventral limbs of the precentral sulcus when subjects observed objects and when they executed movements in response to the objects (“canonical neurons”); and activation in the dorsal premotor cortex, the intraparietal cortex, the parietal operculum (SII), and the superior temporal sulcus when subjects observed gestures (“mirror neurons”). Finally, activations in the ventral premotor cortex and inferior frontal gyrus (Brodmann Area [BA] 44) were found when subjects imitated gestures and executed movements in response to objects. They suggest that in the human brain, the ventral limb of the precentral sulcus may form part of the area designated F5 in the macaque monkey. It is possible that area 44 forms an anterior part of F5, though anatomical studies suggest that it may be a transitional area between the premotor and prefrontal cortices.

Manthey et al. (2003) used fMRI to investigate whether paying attention to objects versus movements modulates premotor activation during the observation of actions. Participants were asked to classify presented movies as showing correct actions, erroneous actions, or senseless movements. Erroneous actions were incorrect either with regard to employed objects, or to performed movements. The ventrolateral premotor cortex (vPMC) and the anterior part of the intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) were strongly activated during the observation of actions in humans. Premotor activation was dominantly located within BA 6, and sometimes extended into BA 44. The presentation of object errors and movements errors showed that left premotor areas were more involved in the analysis of objects, whereas right premotor areas were dominant in the analysis of movements. (Since lateralization is not analyzed in this article, such data may be a useful springboard for commentaries).

To test the hypothesis that action recognition and language production share a common system, Hamzei et al. (2003) combined an action recognition task with a language production task and a grasping movement task. Action recognition-related fMRI activation was observed in the left inferior frontal gyrus and on the border between the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and precentral gyrus (PG), the ventral occipito-temporal junction, the superior and inferior parietal cortex, and in the intraparietal sulcus in the left hemisphere. An overlap of activations due to language production, movement execution, and action recognition was found in the parietal cortex, the left inferior frontal gyrus, and the IFG-PG border. The activation peaks of action recognition and verb generation were always different in single subjects, but no consistent spatial relationship was detected, presumably suggesting that action recognition and language production share a common functional architecture, with functional specialization reflecting developmental happenstance.

Several studies provide behavioral evidence supporting the hypothesis that the system involved in observation and preparation of grasp movements partially shares the cortical areas involved in speech production. Gentilucci (2003) had subjects pronounce either the syllable 'ba' or 'ga' while observing motor acts of hand grasp directed to objects of two sizes, and found that both lip aperture and voice peak amplitude were greater when the observed hand grasp was directed to the large object. Conversely, Glover and Dixon (2002; see Glover et al., 2004 for related results) presented subjects with objects on which were printed either the word "LARGE" or "SMALL." An effect of the words on grip aperture was found early in the reach, but this effect declined continuously as the hand approached the target, presumably due to the effect of visual feedback. Gerlach et al. (2002) show that the left ventral premotor cortex is activated during categorization not only for tools but also for fruit/vegetables and articles of clothing, relative to animals and non-manipulable man-made objects. Such findings support the notion that certain lexical categories may evolve from action-based knowledge but are difficult to account for should knowledge representations in the brain be truly categorically organized.

A number of insights have been gleaned from the study of signed language. Corina et al. (2003) used PET to examine deaf users of ASL as they generated verb signs independently with their right dominant and left nondominant hands (compared to the repetition of noun signs). Nearly identical patterns of left inferior frontal and right cerebellum activity were observed, and these were consistent with patterns that have been reported for spoken languages. Thus lexical-semantic processing in production relies upon left-hemisphere regions regardless of the modality in which a language is realized, and, in signing, no matter which hand is used. Horwitz et al. (2003) studied the activation of Broca's area during the production of spoken and signed language. They showed that BA 45, not BA44, was activated by both speech and signing during the production of language narratives in bilingual subjects (fluent from early childhood in both ASL and English) with the generation of complex movements and sounds as control. Conversely, BA44, not BA45, was activated by the generation of complex articulatory movements of oral-laryngeal or limb musculature. They thus conclude that BA45 is the part of Broca's area that is fundamental to the modality-independent aspects of language generation.

Gelfand and Bookheimer (2003), using fMRI, found that the posterior portion of Broca's area responded specifically to sequence manipulation tasks, while the left supramarginal gyrus was somewhat more specific to sequencing phoneme segments. These results suggest that the left posterior inferior frontal gyrus responds not to the sound structure of language but rather to sequential operations that may underlie the ability to form words out of dissociable elements.

Much more must be done to take us up the hierarchy from elementary actions to the recognition and generation of novel compounds of such actions. Nonetheless, the above preliminary account strengthens the case that no powerful syntactic mechanisms need have been encoded in the brain of the first *Homo sapiens*. Rather it was the extension of the imitation-enriched mirror system to support intended communication that enabled human societies, across many millennia of invention and cultural evolution, to achieve human languages in the modern sense.

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Giuseppe Cossu, Leo Fogassi, Massimo Matelli, Vittorio Gallese and other colleagues. So many people have offered perceptive comments on various results of that effort (as published in, e.g., Arbib 2001a,b, 2002) that the following list is surely incomplete – Shannon Casey, Chris Code, Bob Damper, Kerstin Dautenhahn, Barry Gordon, Jim Hurford, Bipin Indurkha, Chrystopher Nehaniv, and Chris Westbury – but I do hope that all these people (and the BBS referees), whether named or not, will realize how much I value their thoughtful comments and that they will see how their suggestions and comments have helped me clarify, correct and extend my earlier analyses.

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# The Mirror System Hypothesis Stands but the Framework is Much Enriched

*Michael A. Arbib*

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 *The Commentaries in Perspective*

The original Mirror System Hypothesis (MSH) states that

H1. The parity requirement for language in humans is met because Broca's area evolved atop the mirror system for grasping with its capacity to generate and recognize a set of actions.

The target article (TA) goes beyond MSH to distinguish a *language-ready brain* (equipping the child to learn a language) from a *brain that "has" language* (in the sense of, e.g., an innate "principles and parameters" Universal Grammar) and then assert that

H2. Language readiness evolved as a multi-modal manual/facial/vocal system with protosign providing the scaffolding for protospeech – these then co-evolved in an *expanding spiral* to provide "neural critical mass" for protolanguage.

and further that

H3. Protolanguage was holophrastic – "protowords" were semantically more akin to phrases or sentences of modern language than words "as we know them".

H4. Biological evolution gave humans a language-ready brain, but the emergence of human languages from protolanguage was a matter of history, not biology.

H5. While the original MSH focused on macaque F5 and Broca's area, F5 is part of a larger F5-PF-STG system in the macaque and this "lifts" to a larger frontal-parietal-temporal language-ready system in the human brain.

Between them, H2-H5 constitute an extended MSH. What needs stressing is that *these four hypotheses are almost independent* – and thus each must stand on its own. My Response to the commentaries is grouped as follows:

- Section 2 shows that complex imitation must be complemented by planning (2.1) and viewed in developmental perspective (2.2).
- Section 3 generally endorses the role of the mirror system in evolution of the language-ready brain, but mechanisms supporting conversation (3.1), motivation (3.2) and theory of mind (3.3) must also be taken into account.
- Section 4 considers lessons from modeling biological neural networks (4.1) and evolving artificial networks (4.2).
- Section 5 reviews the debate over the claim (H2) that the path to protospeech was indirect. Discussion of co-speech gestures (5.1) shows how strongly manual gesture and speech are intertwined. Future work must factor in new data on the auditory system (5.2). Data on primate vocalization challenge H2 but do not topple it (5.3).

However, any claim that protosign had a large head start (if any) on protospeech in the expanding spiral is questionable. The challenge of evolving a phonological system remains (5.4).

- Section 6 discusses the transition from protolanguage to language with special attention to the debate on H3, the holophrastic view of language (6.1). Issues on bringing semantics into MSH (6.2) are followed by a brief discussion of H4, emphasizing the cultural basis of grammars (6.3).
- Section 7 revisits the overview in Figure TA6. Unfortunately, no commentaries discussed the figure, but I discuss commentary relevant to the issues of whether anatomically separated regions may share an evolutionary history (7.1) and how action planning supplements mirror systems in language evolution (7.2).

In addition to the published Commentaries, I had the privilege of receiving equally fine commentaries from Yoonsuck Choe; Jean-Louis Dessalles & Laleh Ghadakpour; Peter Dominey; James Hurford; Masao Ito; David Kemmerer; Takaki Makino, Kotaro Hirayama & Kazuyuki Aihara; Emese Nagy; Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini & Thomas Bever; Friedemann Pulvermüller; Andreas Rogalewski, Andreas Jansen, Ann-Freya Foerster, Stefan Knecht, & Caterina Breitenstein; Martin Ruchsov; Markus Werning; and Patricia Zukow-Goldring. I am grateful to the many commentators whose correspondence allowed me to more fully understand the issues they raised. I cannot do justice to this “conversation” in 10,000 words here, but hope to develop many of the issues in *Beyond the Mirror: Biology and Culture in the Evolution of Brain and Language* which I am currently preparing for publication by Oxford University Press.

I use **boldface** for authors’ names when responding to published commentaries and *italic* when discussing the others. Rx.y will be short for Section x.y of this Response.

## 1.2 Etcetera

A number of interesting points do not fit into the above framework:

**Birds and Others: Pepperberg** applies my criteria for language readiness to the behavior of the Grey parrot Alex she has taught to communicate with humans using rudiments of English speech. Despite the lack of strong neural homologies between parrots, songbirds (Doupe & Kuhl, 1999) and primates, we may still hope to model relevant circuitry (R4) to better understand what allows a neural network to achieve different language-related functions. **Fitch** notes that some species may have vocal but not bodily imitation, and vice versa. This is irrelevant to MSH which asserts that humans had a particular history. This does not deny that comparative study of neural mechanisms underlying different forms of imitation may help us better understand the workings of the human brain – though the closer the homology, the more likely the payoff.

**Pepperberg’s** assertion that little about my criteria for language-readiness is unique to humans seems a blow to my claim to characterize what allows human children to learn “full language” where other species cannot. Perhaps there are differences of degree: e.g., Alex does not meet my full criteria for “complex imitation.” What enriches the discussion, is that chimpanzees raised in a human environment can exhibit far more “protolanguage” than their wild cousins – observing animals in the wild does not define the limits of complexity of their behavior.

**Lateralization: Kaplan & Iacoboni** show that motor activation to sight of an action is typically bilateral, whereas action sounds activate the motor cortex only in the left hemisphere. This may be related to evolutionary processes that lateralized language. Since lateralization has been debated extensively in BBS (Corballis, 2003), I will not comment here (but see R5.3) beyond the observation that, since children who receive a hemispherectomy early enough can gain fairly good command of language (though comprehension of syntax does show some left-

hemisphere superiority [Dennis & Kohn, 1975]), lateralization would seem to be not so much the genetic specification of different kinds of circuitry in the two hemispheres as a developmental bias which favors, but does not force, differential development of skills there.

**Sexual Selection: Yu & Ballard** cite the hypothesis that language is a product of sexual selection. I am unable to evaluate this hypothesis, but raise two questions: Does sexual selection function differently in early hominids and early great apes? Why does it not yield stronger dimorphism between male and female language use?

**Genetic Underpinnings: Théoret & Fecteau** note attempts to implicate the FOXP2 gene in language. However, FOXP2 is implicated in many systems from the gut to the basal ganglia. It has been argued that because the gene changed only once from mouse to our common ancestor with the great apes, but changed twice in the hominid line, it may hold the key to what distinguishes us from the great apes. However, the mutation of the gene seen in a number of members of the family KE does not reverse the 2 “recent” mutations to yield humans with a chimpanzee-like FOXP2 gene. The KE language deficits seem more a function of motor problems than proving a causal relation between changes in FOXP2 and the evolution of the language-ready brain (Corballis, 2004). **Pepperberg’s** description of the use of expression of the ZENK gene to form a functional map of avian brains for behavior related both to auditory processing and vocal production and the coupling of this to neurophysiology provides an encouraging model for future studies in macaques.

## 2. Complex Imitation

### 2.1 Complex Imitation and Planning

I hypothesize that the mirror system for grasping evolved in 2 stages: first to provide feedback for dexterous manual control, then to underwrite the ability to act with other brain regions to make information available for interacting with others. *Makino et al.* observe that success in complex imitation requires the ability to recognize the goal of an action as the basis for mastering the action which achieves that goal. Indeed, Arbib & Rizzolatti (1997) gave the equation  $\text{Action} = \text{Movement} + \text{Goal}$ , and the MNS model recognizes an action in terms of the goal of successful grasping of an affordance. Complex imitation takes us further. It rests on recognizing how different actions fit together to achieve various subgoals of the overall goal.

**Bickerton** and **Prudkov** assert that there cannot be imitation unless someone has first created something to imitate, and that mirror neurons offer no clue as to how totally novel sequences could have been created. Actually, new skills can emerge by trial-and-error. The problem is to preserve them. The data on chimpanzee cultures (Whiten et al., 2001) show how few skills chimpanzees acquire. I suggest that it is complex imitation that enables humans to move beyond such limited repertoires, cumulatively ratcheting up the available stock of novel skills.

Complex imitation presupposes a capacity for *complex action analysis*, the ability to analyze another's performance as a combination of actions (approximated by variants of) actions already in the repertoire. In modern humans imitation undergirds the child's ability to acquire language, while complex action analysis is essential for the adult's ability to comprehend the novel assemblage of “articulatory gestures” that constitute each utterance of a language. However, the adult does not imitate this assemblage but rather factors it into the planning of his reply. I agree with **Bridgeman** that mirror systems must be supplemented by a planning capability to create, store and execute plans for sequences of actions and communicatory acts. These apparent sequences are the expression of hierarchical structures. In Figure TA5, interpretation of actions of others is coupled to planning of one's own

actions; **Bridgeman** stresses the need for the complementary evolution of these two capabilities. They underlie perception grammars and production grammars, mentioned in discussion of Figure TA1.

**Bickerton** observes that when someone addresses you, you do not just imitate what they said. True. The human mirror system creates a representation that can be used for feedback control, imitation (which monkeys do not exhibit) or generating some appropriate response while inhibiting mimicking. Only in pathology does this inhibition fail, yielding compulsive imitation (echopraxia; Podell et al., 2001).

## ***2.2 Imitation in Developmental Perspective***

*Zukow-Goldring* sees affordances and *effectivities* (what the body can do; Shaw & Turvey, 1981) as two sides of the mirror system. By directing the child's attention to its own effectivities in relation to affordances, the caregiver narrows the search space for learning, and thus enhances that learning (Zukow-Goldring, 1996). These practices may pave the way to early word learning (Zukow-Goldring, Rader, & Cain, 2001). The prolonged period of infant dependency in humans combines with caregiving to provide conditions for complex social learning.

Neonatal imitation is based on moving single effectors and thus differs from goal-directed imitation. (Studdert-Kennedy, 2002 discusses data consistent with the view that the infant at first imitates sounds by moving one articulator and only later coordinates articulators.) Social reciprocity in neonatal imitation (3.1) may be a necessary precursor for complex imitation, establishing that “I am like the other”. Biological evolution may have selected for neonatal imitation as a basis for complex imitation.

**Yu & Ballard** found that body cues signaling intention can aid word learning in adults, suggesting the utility of such cues for children. Their computational model reliably associates spoken words and their perceptually grounded meanings. This model employs “small steps” which, they suggest, would be accessible by a variety of social species and “yet they were only traversed by us.” However, they seem accessible to parrots and bonobos as well as the 2 year old child – which is why I emphasize complex imitation.

## **3. Complementing Complex Imitation: Motivation and Theory of Mind**

Conversation, motivation and Theory of Mind – and prosody (R5.3) – must all be addressed in a satisfactory account of the language-ready brain. This requires expanding MSH rather than weakening it.

### ***3.1 Conversation***

**Kotchoubey** emphasizes pragmatics, e.g., what we say depends on the mental state (R3.3) of our “hearer”: However, his claim “We do not use language to transmit information, but to persuade and motivate.” (R3.2) seems a false dichotomy. “Look at this beautiful flower” combines information “This flower is beautiful” and persuasion “Look at this flower”. **Kotchoubey** (p.c.) stresses that his starting point is cooperation between two or more humans, reinforcing the claims of MSH for relating praxic and communicative actions.

*Nagy* suggests an innate basis for conversation that precedes its pragmatic function – newborn infants communicate by using “imitation” right after birth (Nagy and Molnar, 2004). She suggests that language develops from these early intersubjective “conversations” (Trevvarthen, 2001). The cycle of turn taking in “imitating” a small repertoire of “almost innate” gestures is crucial in establishing the social pattern of turn taking (R2.2). (Cf. “motherese”, R5.3.)

### 3.2 Motivation

**Prudkov** downplays complex imitation, arguing that the complexity of languages builds on the ability of the human brain to construct diverse goals. He suggests that animals can only form learned motivations when basic drives are activated. However, animals can acquire secondary reinforcers, etc. Chimpanzees have the ability to develop non-innate subgoals (e.g., cracking nuts). The mirror system is well-linked to the motivational system in the macaque. TA shows that the F5 mirror system for grasping is best understood within the larger F5-PF-STSa mirror system for manual and oro-facial actions. Rizzolatti et al. (2001) observe that STSa is also part of a circuit that includes the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex and so may be involved in the elaboration of affective aspects of social behavior. Thus Prudkov's transition to "non-innate motivation" may be less proximate for the evolution of the language-ready brain *per se* than complex imitation, which made possible the rapid acquisition of new skills.

### 3.3 Theory of Mind

**Fabrega** stresses that successful pantomime presupposes social cognition, awareness of self, and goal setting – reversing the view of those who attribute self consciousness to language (MacPhail, 2000). **Fabrega** also asks "what are thoughts beyond internal use of language"? Arbib (2001a) suggests that there are forms of consciousness common to many mammals, but that mirror system developments help explain why humans also have forms of consciousness that build upon, rather, than precede language. Development of increasing subtlety of language can feed back into the non-language system to refine our perceptions and experience.

**Fabrega** says that I do not specify how much of the protosign/protospeech spiral is enough to support the cultural evolution of language and asks whether "protoculture" emerges as the expanding spiral gets underway. I suggest that chimpanzees have protoculture (Whiten et al 2001) but human culture is qualitatively different, and that language makes it so.

**Williams** sees the greatest evolutionary advantage conferred by spoken language as its ability to communicate mentalistic concepts (Theory of Mind, ToM). **Williams** stresses selection pressure for social maneuvering where I have emphasized physical activities. Surely the two "domains of discourse" complement each other. **Williams** notes the possible role of the mirror neuron system in mentalising (Gallese, 2003; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003). We need to investigate whether an account can be given of a shared evolution of "mirror systems" suiting both ToM and complex imitation. I hypothesize that the ancestral mirror system for manual praxis was distinct from the putative mirror system for facial expression of emotion. The former would support pantomime and thence on to multi-modal symbols; and then the availability of symbols could enrich the latter to yield rudiments of ToM.

**Indurkha** sees the key to language evolution in an ability to see and feels things from another perspective and stresses the role of metaphor. *Projection* restructures the target by creating a new ontology for it; generalization of responsiveness of a mirror neuron may provide a novel ontology for objects and actions that can newly yield this activity. TA shows that pantomime must be supplemented by conventional gestures to yield protosign. Within language itself, metaphor broadens our language by extending (proto)words to new contexts. In some cases, context is enough to recapture the shade of meaning. In others, one must invent terms which can express shadings specific to the new domain.

**Indurkha** suggests that the ability to project one's self into other animals or objects might mark a crucial transition in hominid evolution. I think this notion is important. Much work on empathy emphasizes the similarities

between self and other – but one must be able to maintain different models of other agents, adaptively going beyond what is held in common to imagine essential differences.

**Williams** and **Théoret & Fecteau** see autism as providing a window on the role of the mirror system in ToM and language. (**Théoret & Fecteau** add analysis of blindness.) Deficits in autism are prominent in speech associated with social communication but praxic aspects of language are fairly well preserved. Perhaps what is affected is not so much language per se as the integration of this with affect and ToM. Interestingly, autistics may exhibit stereotypic mimicking (which monkey's *don't* have). Thus it must be reiterated that a fully functional human mirror system inhibits mere repetition (echopraxia and echolalia) and instead relates the perception of perceived actions to the planning of an appropriate course of action.

## 4. Lessons from Modeling

### 4.1 Biological Neural Networks

**Horwitz et al.** note the importance of babbling in the development of spoken and sign languages. ILGM, mentioned briefly in TA, is a theory of how “manual babbling” leads to an effective set of grasps. **Arbib & Rizzolatti** (1997) discussed the relevance of inverse and forward models to MSH, building on insights of **Jordan and Rumelhart** (1992) into vocal babbling. **Ito and Makino et al.** also stressed the importance of internal models; cf. **Carr et al.** (2003), **Makino & Aihara** (2003), **Miall** (2003), **Wolpert et al.** (2003), and **Ito** (2004).

Since **Piatelli-Palmarini & Bever** note the problem of determining similarity criteria for learning models, it is worth noting that the MNS and ILGM models have “innate” hand-related biases which enable them to acquire a range of grasps without having them built in. MNS input is the *hand state* relating the hand to the goal affordance of the object. ILGM acquires grasps whose visual manifestation MNS is to learn. ILGM has as its basis that the child reaches for a salient object, executes the grasp reflex if palmar contact is made, and builds a repertoire of grasps based on those which prove to be stable – stability supplies the reinforcement signal.

**Dominey** models the transformation between semantic structures and grammatical structures. He exploits the developmental analog of fractionation of holophrases to yield “words” which fill slots thus formed in the holophrase. **Dominey et al.** (2003) suggest that the resultant categorical distinction between function and content elements evolved first for sensory-motor function and then was exploited for phrasal-conceptual function. **Dominey** see his modeling as consistent with **Ullman's** (2004) declarative/procedural model in which the mental lexicon depends on temporal-lobe substrates of declarative memory, while mental grammar depends on a “procedural” network of frontal, basal-ganglia, parietal and cerebellar structures supporting learning and execution of motor and cognitive skills.

**Horwitz. et al.** model how learning an auditory target for each native language sound may occur via a mirror neuron system. **Guenther** (p.c.) notes that in this modeling, the perceptual system organizes largely independently of the motor system, whereas motor development relies very heavily on the auditory perceptual system.

**Horwitz. et al.** emphasize the importance of combining neural modeling with neurophysiological and brain imaging data. **Horwitz and Tagamets** (2003) and **Arbib et al.** (1994) developed techniques for using models of primate neurophysiological data to predict and analyze results of human brain imaging. **Arbib et al.** (2000) analyze imitation of motor skills, relating human brain imaging to data on the macaque mirror system.

## 4.2 Evolving Artificial Networks

We turn to using “simulated evolution” to obtain versions of initially unstructured networks whose parameters fit them to better perform or learn a class of actions. (Cangelosi & Parisi, 2001, and Briscoe, 2003, include papers using artificial evolution to probe constraints on language but almost all the papers are far removed from neurobiology.)

**Parisi et al.** support MSH through computer simulations and behavioral experiments with humans which suggest that seeing objects or processing words referring to objects automatically activates canonical actions we perform on them. **Parisi et al.** (p.c.) point out that since actions are the only inter-individually accessible aspect of behavior, interpreting meanings in terms of actions might explain how meanings can be shared.

**Borenstein & Ruppin** evolve networks in which evolution of imitation promotes emergence of neural mirroring. However, primate data suggest that neural mirroring preceded imitation in human evolution. **Borenstein** (p.c.) responds that the key point is that in their system only the evolution of imitation was solicited, yet a mirror system emerged – suggesting that the link between imitation and mirroring may be universal.

**Pulvermüller** opts for specifying the putative neural circuits of syntax and recursion first and thinking about possible evolution later. In his model (Pulvermüller 2002), words are represented by distributed cell assemblies whose cortical topographies reflect aspects of word meaning; these assemblies are formed by correlation learning and anatomical constraints. Syntactic rules emerge from the interplay between sequence detectors and general principles of neuronal dynamics. My concern is that this approach is so focused on symbols that it is ill-suited to ground an evolutionary approach to neurolinguistics.

Fagg & Arbib (1992) modeled the surprising speed with which monkeys could learn to associate a visual pattern and a motor response. This led us to distinguish Stage I from Stage II learning. Stage I may take months of shaping for the monkey to learn a general task like “associate a new visual pattern on this screen with the correct pull on the lever in front of you and you will get a reward”. In Stage II, he knows the task, and then takes only 7 or so trials to stabilize the correct response to a novel visual pattern (Mitz et al., 1991). My concern with models using small neural networks is that the search space is so restricted that Stage I is no longer necessary. As one approaches the more biological models of R4.1 one must constrain evolutionary models to provide insights that link to the anatomy and neurophysiology of real brains. A key challenge for MSH-related modeling is to understand how to “evolve” from a brain for which Stage I learning can never yield the ability to learn language to a human brain in which perhaps 2.5 years of learning is required for Stage I to make possible the “word explosion” which distinguishes the human infant from the chimpanzee.

## 5. The Path to Protospeech

Several commentaries concerned H2: protosign provides scaffolding for protospeech. Those who take a “speech only” approach ignore the fact that language is multi-modal. However, future work on MSH needs greater attention to the auditory system.

### 5.1 Co-Speech Gestures

**McNeill et al.** show that speech and “gesticulations” form a single system – a “gesticulation” (Kendon 1988) is a motion that embodies a meaning relatable to the accompanying speech. About 90% of gesticulations synchronize with the speech segments with which they are co-expressive. I disagree with **McNeill et al.’s** claim that gesture and speech must convey the same idea unit. Kita & Özyürek (2003) compared speech-gesture coordination in Turkish,

Japanese, and English descriptions of an animated cartoon. Gestures used to express motion events were influenced by how features of motion events were expressed in each language, but also by spatial information that was never verbalized. However, the key point is that gesticulation is truly part of language.

**McNeill et al.** reject the claim that language started as a gesture language that was supplanted by speech and stress the importance of a close coupling between manual and vocal action. However, they suggest that my concept of an expanding spiral of protosign and protospeech does not go far enough. They advocate the evolution of a speech-gesture system in which speech and gesture evolved in lockstep. This criticism may be mistaken. Gesticulations are part of language, not protolanguage. By contrast, protosign may indeed have had a pantomimic base, with protosign scaffolding protospeech.

In any case, **McNeill et al.** establish that protolanguage was multi-modal and that gesture was not “turned off” in evolution. Relating this to brain function, **McNeill et al.** offer the telling example of a man who can only control his limb movements through arduous visually guided attentional control yet can still gesticulate while speaking even when he cannot see his hands. *Kemmerer* describes a brain-damaged subject, with intact semantic and grammatical knowledge of motion events, whose ability to retrieve the phonological forms of concrete nouns, action verbs, and spatial prepositions was severely impaired but whose ability to produce gestures with language-typical information packaging was mostly preserved (Kemmerer et al., 2005).

**Emmorey** concedes that the existence of modern sign languages might seem to support my hypothesis that there was an early stage in the evolution of language in which communication was predominantly gestural. However, she rejects this view because “the only modern communities in which a signed language is dominant have deaf members.” However, there are communities of hearing people using a signed language, albeit not their primary one (Kendon 1988). She suggests that sign languages can tentatively be traced back only 500 years, but such historical estimates are suspect. For example, <http://www.ASLinfo.com/trivia.cfm> says that by 530 A.D. Benedictine monks invented signs to circumvent their vow of silence.

**Emmorey** asserts that “If communicative pantomime and protosign preceded protospeech, it is not clear why protosign simply did not evolve into sign language.” **MacNeilage & Davis** suggest that I am “vulnerable” because I posit an *open* pantomimic protosign stage whereas Hockett’s (1978) asserted that if manual communication had ever achieved openness, we would never have abandoned it for speech. However, I make no claim that protosign by itself realized the full potential of this openness. **Emmorey** further asserts: “A gestural origins theory must explain why speech evolved at all, particularly when choking to death is a potential byproduct of speech evolution.” First, I do see slight advantages for speech over sign (agreeing with Corballis, 2002) or, rather, for the early combination of protospeech with protosign over protosign alone, though this judgment is subjective. Second, Clegg & Aiello (2000) show that the risk of choking is highly over-stated: “Mortality statistics for England & Wales ... [show] that overall mortality from choking on food was very low averaging 0.6 per 100,000 head of population.” Third, just as it is a matter of historical contingency that some tribes have both signed and spoken languages, it may well be that some tribes of early humans had languages dominated by speech and others had protolanguages dominated by sign. At a time of evolutionary bottleneck before humans left Africa 50,000 years ago, speech could have taken a dominant role. The counter-question to **Emmorey** is then: “If speech has primacy and sign is a modern innovation, how can one explain the ubiquity of co-speech gestures?”

## 5.2 Taking the Auditory System Seriously

**Bosman et al.**, **Rauschecker** and **Horwitz et al.** all make clear that future work on MSH must pay more attention to data on the auditory system than does TA.

**Bosman et al. (p.c.)** argue that the biological principles which supported the evolution of mirror neurons for grasping may also have independently supported the evolution of auditory mirror neurons, but agree that gesture may have helped establish certain semantic aspects of protolanguage by the use of pantomime. Their view is that protosign and protospeech coexisted, coevolved and each contributed to the development of the other.

**Bosman et al.** discuss neurons in frontal areas of the monkey that respond strongly to vocalizations and thus suggest that this domain may be the precursor of a vocalization mirror system similar to the mirror system for grasping. **Rauschecker** presents further relevant material on the macaque auditory system (R7).

**Horwitz et al.** note that a human may recognize  $10^5$  auditory objects, whereas the number that interests a monkey seems small. Moreover, monkeys seem far better in vision than audition in the use of long-term memory for objects. They thus argue that biological evolution gave hominids the ability to better discriminate and categorize auditory objects, retain them in memory, and relate them to articulatory gestures. I would agree, while noting that the success of speech has been linked to the ability to form an immense vocabulary from a small set of “phonemes” (the Particulate Principle; Studdert-Kennedy, 2002).

## 5.3 Primate Vocalization

The issue is whether primate calls evolved directly to speech. **Seyfarth** argues that the parallels between primate same-different judgments for calls and children’s perception of words cannot be ignored. However, such parallels suggest properties of auditory discrimination necessary for protospeech but do not help explain the crucial transition to production of an open-ended repertoire of symbols linked to an open semantics. **Seyfarth** faults me for characterizing primate vocalizations as “involuntary” signals but Footnote TA5 addressed this explicitly. **Seyfarth** shows that I am wrong to deny that primate vocalizations are related to cortical regions, but his data primarily concern audition. **Bosman et al** suggest that in monkey there is overlap between area F5 and the cortical larynx representation but **Gilissen** argues that monkey calls cannot be used as models for speech production because they are genetically determined in their acoustic structure. A number of brain structures crucial for the production of learned motor patterns such as speech production are dispensable for the production of monkey calls (Jürgens, 1998).

I have been unable to consult Cheney & Seyfarth (2004) which apparently asserts that primate social knowledge bears striking resemblances to the meanings we express in language, which are built up by combining discrete-valued entities in a structured, hierarchical, rule-governed, and open-ended manner. Though uninformed, I speculate that **Seyfarth** may be misled by our human ability to offer a language-like description of the primates’ abilities. This is not to deny that pre-linguistic knowledge of social relations is relevant to evolving the language ready brain (R3.3).

**Provine** discusses contagious yawning and laughing. These seem analogous to the contagious alarm calls of nonhuman primates. He observes that laughter is a ritualization of the sound of labored breathing in rough and tumble play – but, presumably, we are talking of biological selection rather than the free symbol creation to which ritualization contributes at the phonological and morphosyntactic level in language (Bybee 2001). Laughter *punctuates* the speech stream, in contrast with the tight integration of gesticulation and speech (**McNeill et al.**).

**Kotchoubey** and **Fitch** note that my emphasis on cognitive-symbolic aspects of language ignores prosody. **Kotchoubey** notes that prosody subserves both affective prosody (emotional expression) and linguistic prosody (as in distinguishing between an assertion and a question) and that both forms of prosodic information are processed mainly in the right temporal lobe. In similar vein, **Gilissen** notes that human vocal behavior does resemble monkey calls in the emotional intonations superimposed on the verbal component. **Kotchoubey** (p.c.) observes that in many languages, intonation is the only distinction between question and declaration. He thus suggests that linguistic prosody is a part of the right hemisphere so closely controlled by the left that they cannot work without each other. This is reminiscent of the coupling of gesticulations to the syntax and semantics of a specific language.

**Gilissen** cites Falk's (2004b) evolutionary perspective on the hypothesis that, as human infants develop, a special form of infant-directed speech (motherese) provides a scaffold for their eventual acquisition of language. This enriches our discussion of the role of the caregiver in neonatal "conversation" (R3.1). **Gilissen** says that the special vocalizations of human motherese are in marked contrast to the relatively silent mother/infant interactions that characterize chimpanzees, yet suggests a possible link between monkey calls and motherese. This apparent contradiction suggests that the *affective* content of motherese (and protolanguage) builds upon the monkey vocalization system, but the *information* content of motherese (and protolanguage) has a complementary evolutionary history. **Kotchoubey** suggests that the left hemispheric subsystem develops as described by MSH to subserve the cognitive-symbolic function, whereas the right hemispheric subsystem is a direct successor of monkey vocalization mechanisms and gives language its intonational color. It is a long standing observation (Hughlings Jackson 1879-80) that imprecations survive damage to the human brain that blocks normal speech. Arbib (2000) thus suggested that the language-ready brain integrates action-oriented and affect-oriented systems in a pattern of cooperative computation.

**Fitch** adopts Darwin's hypothesis that our prelinguistic ancestors possessed an intermediate "protolanguage" that was musical and that music scaffolds the early structural and imitative aspects of language (prosody). He sees the semantic stage as coming later. However, even if we accept the importance of "musicality", it does not follow that the co-evolution of vocal and manual gesture is tied more closely to music than pantomime and linguistic communication – but it does encourage us to investigate how dance and music might enrich MSH.

#### **5.4 Evolving a Phonological System**

**MacNeilage & Davis** argue that my view that pantomime could be an open system disregards the view that for language to become an open system it must have a combinatorial phonology consisting of meaningless elements. However, I explicitly distinguish pantomime from protosign. But I do say too little about getting from a pantomimic repertoire to a speech repertoire. The following adapted from Arbib (2004c) may be helpful:

Signing exploits the signer's rich praxic repertoire of arm and hand movements, and builds up vocabulary by language-sanctioned variations on this multi-dimensional theme (move a handshake along a trajectory to a particular position while making appropriate facial gestures). By contrast, speech has no rich behavioral repertoire of non-speech movements to build upon. Instead evolution went particulate, so that the word is built (to a first approximation) from a language-specific stock of phonemes (actions defined by the coordinated movement of several articulators, but with only the goal of sounding right rather than conveying meaning in themselves). On this analysis, a basic reach and grasp corresponds to a single word in signed language; whereas in speech, a basic reach and grasp is akin to a phoneme, with a word being one level up the hierarchy. In either case, the brain must provide a computational medium in which

already available elements can be composed to form new ones, irrespective of the level at which these elements were themselves defined.

I characterized MacNeilage's Frame/Content theory as being about "the evolution of syllabification" but offering "no clue as to what might have linked such a process to the expression of meaning". **MacNeilage & Davis** note that they now address this criticism by arguing that the first words may have been kinship terms based on baby-talk (MacNeilage and Davis, 2004a – I received the final version only after TA was "set in concrete"). I do not deny that words like "mama" and "dada" may have been based on baby-talk. But to suggest that this gives us insights into the emergence of protolanguage seems to me to conflate phylogeny and ontogeny – the prototalk of adult hunter-gatherers is unlikely to have been much like baby-talk.

For **Fabrega**, the complexities of speech production seem in excess of what protosign/protospeech spiraling entails. I disagree. Even a protovocabulary of a few hundred protowords would already provide selective advantage for changes in the vocal apparatus which "full" language could exploit without further change. In any case, I insist that the appropriate framework must also explain cospeech gestures.

**Kaplan & Iacoboni** argue that mirror neurons in premotor cortex which respond to the visual and auditory consequences of actions allow for a modality-independent and agent-independent coding of actions, which may have been important for the emergence of language. Kaplan & Iacoboni (in preparation) found that when subjects simultaneously saw and heard an action, there was greater activity in the premotor cortex compared with control conditions in which they only saw or only heard the action. *Rogalewski et al.* report the use of TMS to show that linguistic tasks, like speaking, covert reading, and listening to speech, activate the hand motor system bilaterally (Floel et al. 2003). **Kaplan & Iacoboni** argue that the role of audiovisual mirror neurons in the evolution of language deserves more attention. I agree, but suggest that the best framework for this is provided by the expanding spiral hypothesis. In discussing Kohler et al. (2002) and Ferrari et al. (2003), TA argued that these data do not support the claim that protospeech mechanisms could have evolved from F5 without the scaffolding provided by protosign. This matter is further debated by Fogassi & Ferrari (2004), Arbib (2004a) and MacNeilage & Davis (2004a).

## 6 From Protolanguage to Language

### 6.1 For and against holophrasis

The hypothesis that protolanguage was based on holophrases was offered as an alternative to the view of protolanguage utterances as strings of "words as we know them".

**Fitch** supports the holophrase theory of language origin but suggests that Baldwinian exaptations may underlie the first behavioral stages in the transition from holistic communication toward modern language. I accept that the development of an articulatory system adequate to the demands of (proto)language phonology may have involved a Baldwinian effect but doubt **Fitch's** claim that the transition to language must have been "strongly and consistently shaped by selection ... given the communicative and conceptual advantages that a compositional, lexicalized language offers." Agriculture, writing and living provide evidence that being advantageous does not imply a genetic change. Because of this I took pains to make clear that one's account of the evolution of the human brain might be seen as having two very different results: "the language-ready brain" versus "the brain that 'has' language."

**Bridgeman** argues against holophrasis. He asserts that monkey calls can be paraphrased in 1 or 2 words such as “leopard”. However, the leopard call’s meaning can be better approximated in English by the sentence: “There is a leopard nearby. Danger! Danger! Run up a tree to escape.” To this he might respond, “It’s only one word, because ‘leopard’ is enough to activate the whole thing.” But once one moves to protolanguage one may want to convey meanings like “There is a dead leopard. Let’s feast upon it.” and we clearly cannot use the alarm call as the word for leopard in this utterance. **Bridgeman** asserts that the generality of words is about the same in all languages and therefore constitutes a possibly biological “universal” of language. However, it is well known that a word in one language may require a phrase or more to translate into another language. I thus maintain that the size of words is a result of a long history of building increasingly flexible languages.

**Bickerton** is so “language-centered” that he gives us little help in imaginatively recreating possible scenarios for a time when hominid protolanguage was at an early stage of development. He asserts that it is “questionable whether any species could isolate ‘a situation’ from the unbroken, ongoing stream of experience unless it already had a language with which to do so.” But we know that biological evolution yielded a repertoire of primate calls each of which is akin to (but very different from) to a “protoword” describing a “situation” in my sense, and I have tried to imagine how the brain could have so evolved that such protowords could be “invented” and disseminated in hominid communities. I suggest that early hominids very rarely created protowords for new situations. I only require a slow accretion of such nameable situations in each generation to build towards the critical mass that constituted protolanguage. **Bickerton** notes that those who play charades use “a large set of ‘disambiguating signs’ – stereotypic gestures for ‘film title’, ‘book title’, etc.” I concede that early hominids had no signs for these! But the crucial point is this: When I posit there is a protoword for “The alpha male has killed a meat animal and now the tribe has a chance to feast together. Yum, yum!”, I do not claim that (at first) there were protowords for all the variations like “The alpha male has killed a meat animal but its too scrawny to eat. Woe is we.” I think this point also addresses one half of **MacNeilage & Davis’s** dismissal of my claim that hominids in the protospeech stage could have “dashed off complex semantic concepts with holistic phonetic utterances”. **Bickerton** cites Tallerman (2004) who argues that holophrasis was incompatible with contrastive phonology, but (as argued above) as the protovocabulary increased, the different protowords (whether signed, spoken or both) would need to be readily generated and comprehended, and this could provide as much pressure for the particulate principle as does the anti-holophrase position.

**Bickerton** (p.c.) makes the telling point that I have offered no example of a hypothetical conversation consisting of representations of frequently occurring situations and that any model that will not do conversation (R3.1) is “worse than dubious”. I have given too little thought to this, but suggest that protoconversations may have been like the interactions that we see in nonhuman primates but with a few protowords interspersed, rather than taking – from the start – the form of a steady interchange of protowords.

I accept **Bickerton’s** argument that it is implausible that all “real words” are foreshadowed by widely distributed fragments of protowords. However, Kirby’s (2000) computer simulation shows that statistical extraction of substrings whose meanings stabilize can yield surprisingly powerful results across *many* generations. I thus see the “Wray-Kirby mechanism” as part of the story of the protolanguage-language transition, but not the whole one. My sour fruit story, plus aspects of ritualization, provide other mechanisms whereby the virtues of a synthetic description might emerge – with the consequent demand for a protosyntax to disambiguate combinations once the combinatorics began to explode.

**Wray** notes that neurolinguistic and clinical evidence suggests that linguistic representation in the brain is mapped on the principle of *functional motivation* (Wray 2002a: Chapter 14). Wray (p.c.) expands on this as follows: When people lose language skills after a stroke, it is common for them to retain formulaic expressions such as “good morning” while they are unable to compose novel messages (cf. R5.3). She focused on the functions of the material, and proposed that the functional locus supporting a class of lexical material – for example, names for people whose faces we recognize might be activated via the mechanisms that processes visual face recognition, while expressions used for context-determined phatic interaction would be activated via, say, the right hemisphere areas that handle context pragmatics – would be linked to the “language” areas of the left hemisphere. Damage to left hemisphere language areas could block the ability to generate names and expressions on request, but spare the ability to use the words and expressions themselves, *if activated as functional wholes*.

**Wray** supports the holophrasis theory by focusing on the linguistic phenomenon of irregularity. She presents a number of “oddities” about language use that are readily explained if humans are predisposed to treat input and output holistically where they can, and to engage in linguistic analysis only to the extent demanded by expressive need. Her formulation bridges between “true wholes” (protolanguage holophrasis) and “apparent compounds” (formulas within a modern language) – supporting our view that the “protolexicon” had many such wholes, rather than combining “words as we know them”. She shows that the “holophrastic impulse” remains part of modern language use, even though languages have long supplanted protolanguages in human society.

**Bridgeman** denies holophrasis but then asks “How could the sorts of words that cannot be used alone get invented?” and looks for evidence to the development of language in children. He concedes that a child's first utterances are holophrases but “next comes a 2-word slot grammar.” But ontogeny  $\neq$  phylogeny. The child “extracting statistics” from the adult word stream is a far cry from early hominids for whom very few (proto)words already existed. In modeling the 2-year old, Hill (1983, Arbib, Conklin and Hill, 1987; Peters 1983 for data) sees the child as extracting fragments of the adult's speech stream to provide a set of templates that describe situations. At first “Want milk” or “Love Teddy” are unanalyzed wholes, but then words common to many templates crystallize out, and word categories follow as it is recognized that certain words can fill similar slots (recall *Dominey's* modeling, R4.1). This supports the claim that “holophrasis” is prototypical but that modern communities provide a setting in which the “Wray-Kirby mechanism” can extract existing words in a few years rather than extending the protovocabulary over the course of many generations.

*Piattelli-Palmarini & Bever* note that while idioms like “He kicked the bucket.” may be semantically non-compositional, they do obey strict syntactic constraints. However, it is a mistake to confuse Wray's observation of the role of formulas in modern language use with the idea that protowords were themselves formulas. We are trying to imagine hominids without syntax and understand how they did get syntax. *Hurford* asserts that a synthetic evolutionary route to compositional syntax is “simpler” than the analytic (Wray-Arbib) account. But by what measure? Once you have discovered the combinatorial power of using syntax to combine words, then words are simpler. But if you have not done so, then labeling significant events or constructs seems the simpler strategy – which is why I still support the holophrasis theory as a viable alternative to the synthetic account.

## 6.2 Bringing in Semantics

The issue of semantics was emphasized not only by **Indurkha** (R3.1) but also by *Choe, Dessalles & Ghadapour, Hurford, Pulvermüller* and *Werning*. *Hurford* caught me in an embarrassing lapse. When I disagreed

with “Hurford's suggestion that there is a mirror system for all concepts,” it turns out that I was disagreeing not with the ideas published in Hurford (2004) but with Hurford's preliminary ideas as expressed in early discussions before the paper was written. I am happy to report that we are now in essential agreement about the diversity of perceptual and motor schemas.

*Choe* cites a thought experiment of Choe and Bhamidipati (2004) to assert that voluntary action can provide meaning to one's internal perceptual state, and that maintained invariance in the internal perceptual state can serve as a criterion for learning the appropriate action sequence. **Parisi et al.** assert “If we interpret not only signs but also their meaning in terms of motor actions, we can understand how meanings can be shared between speakers and hearers. Motor actions are the only aspect of behavior which is inter-individually accessible.” However, there is no “reddish action” as such. And we must be careful about jumping to the idea that every gesture mimics a direct action. Nonetheless, I welcome the discussion by **Parisi et al.** of evidence that language is grounded in action. Studies on the neural basis of cognition suggest that different areas are activated for manipulable and non-manipulable objects (Martin & Chao, 2001); manual gestures may be automatically activated not only by visual stimuli but by words, too (Gentilucci, 2003a,b); and Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak (in press) found in a part verification task that responding by moving the arm in a direction incompatible with the part location was slow relative to responding in a direction compatible with the part location.

We thus see why *Ruchsow* argued that MSH is in good agreement with an externalistic account of semantics. The *externalist* denies that there is any fact about my mental or neural states that constitutes the meaning of my words (Kripke, 1982; Wittgenstein, 1958). For *internalists*, conversely, cognition is computation over (symbolic) representations (Kurthen, 1992). *Ruchsow* rejects internalism because it lets us “throw the world away”, allowing reason and thought to be focused on the inner model instead (Clark, 1999). *Ruchsow* finds that many passages in TA can be read in favor of externalism but sees “some sympathy for internalism” in references to fMRI and PET studies. Actually, I regard both externalism and internalism as incomplete and have sought a framework in which the partial truths of each can be integrated. Arbib & Hesse (1986) expanded my “internal” schema theory of “schemas in the head” to provide a complementary account of “external” schemas that reside in the statistics of social interaction and are thus the expression of socially shared (externalist) knowledge.

*Werning* confronts the “*complex first*” paradox: substance concepts are more frequently lexicalized across languages than attribute concepts and their lexical expressions are ontogenetically acquired earlier. This is hard to reconcile with the view that prototypical substance concepts are semantically complex so that, e.g., the substance concept [*mango*] is made up of the vector of attribute concepts <*orange, oval, big, soft, sweet, edible, ...*>. My solution is to distinguish the distributed code for “orange” as a feature implicit in early visual processing from the neural representation of “orange” as a concept that can be put into words, *Werning* cites Fodor's (1995) view of mental representations to argue that it would be logically impossible to have two representations with the same content in one and the same brain. However, data reviewed in TA3.1 shows that the size of an object may have different representations for grasping (dorsal) and “declaring” (ventral). Similarly, the color of an object may be salient in segmenting it from the background or distinguishing it from other objects, yet not enter consciousness. For the child, the redness of his truck is as indissoluble from the truck's identity as the fact that it has wheels – so the word “truck” may imply “redness” and “wheels” when the child does not have words or well-formed concepts for either.

*Dessalles & Ghadakpour* stress that an account of the evolutionary emergence of language should “explain *why* and *how* our ancestors got minds able to form predicative structures, and to express them through compositional languages.” (See Hurford, 2003, for a different approach to this problem.) They point to a crucial distinction between gaining the use of predicative structures to communicate some aspects of a situation and using predicates to “think new thoughts”: “We can systematically express the negative version of a predicative structure, e.g. ‘Leo doesn’t grasp the raisin’, while there is no perceptive meaning corresponding to the negation of a visual scene.”: I would agree, yet would suggest that one can imagine a series of “inventions” that would build more and more general power into such a capability. At first, the effort to apply certain recognition criteria failing to meet threshold is what justifies the negation. This requires that context demand that only some tests, of all possible perceptual tests, be applied (cf. presuppositions). I would probably not say to you “There are no onions in my office” unless, for example, you knew I was in my office and had expressed your need of onions. TA7 talks of language capabilities being extended by bricolage over a long period of time, and argues that “the language ready brain” provided by the genome lacks much of what we now take for granted as parts of language. I view *and*, *not* and *every* as human inventions augmenting language and thus reshaping thought.

### 6.3 Concerning Innate Universal Grammar

**Kotchoubey** questions my view that the development of language from protolanguage was social by noting that dissemination of “inventions” currently exploits such institutions as writing, hierarchical social organization and mass media. I respond that it was because early humans did not have such institutions that their inventions would diffuse more slowly “by protoword of mouth – and hand.” That is why I think that the “cumulative bricolage” that led to the earliest “full” languages may have taken 100,000 years. **Kotchoubey** (p.c.) responds that the social mechanisms present from the very beginning, e.g., socialization in tribes and education in families, are known to be very conservative and to brake progress rather to promote it. He thus argues that development of the first language rested on biological natural selection.

**Kotchoubey** notes that degrees of linguistic and genetic similarity between populations correlate and that the transition from protolanguage to language may have covered 1500 to 2000 generations, and so he cannot understand why biological mechanisms should be denied during the evolution of the very first language. Yes, Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1996) attest that the length of isolation of a group yields correlated amounts of drift in both genetic structure and language structure but there is no suggestion that the genetic changes are linked to the language changes. The counter to my hypothesis, then, would be to offer concrete proposals on how to shift the boundary from my set of criteria for protolanguage further into the language domain of syntax and compositional semantics. But how far? My firm conviction is that the genome does not specify a Principles and Parameters Universal Grammar, but I could accept that phonological expression of hierarchical structure might require a biological change not within my current criteria for language-readiness. (Recall **Fitch** on Baldwinian exaptation, R6.1.)

*Kemmerer* supports the view that grammatical categories gradually emerged over hundreds of generations of historical language transmission and change. Linguists identify grammatical categories primarily by formal criteria but the criteria used in some languages are either completely absent in others or are employed in ways that seem bizarre compared to English. For example, verbs are often marked for tense, aspect, mood, and transitivity but some languages, like Vietnamese, lack all such inflection, while Makah applies aspect and mood markers not only to words that are translated into English as verbs, but also to words that are translated into English as nouns or

adjectives. Croft (e.g., 2001) addresses such quandaries by “construction grammar”, seeking to identify the grammatical categories of individual languages according to the constructions unique to those languages. Of course, one may relate these to semantic and pragmatic prototypes: prototypical nouns specify objects and have referential functions, prototypical verbs specify actions and have predicative functions, etc. Such considerations are very much consistent with the notion that languages (not Language-with-a-capital-L) evolved culturally through bricolage within many communities and diffusion across communities (Dixon, 1997; Lass, 1997; Aikhenvald & Dixon, 2002; Ritt, 2004).

## 7 Towards a Mirror-System Based Neurolinguistic Model

Not a single commentary discussed Figure TA6 but I gather here a number of comments relevant to the program it exemplified.

### *7.1 Anatomically Distinct Regions May Share an Evolutionary History*

Figure TA6 offered a highly conceptual extension of the FARS model to include the mirror system for grasping and the language system evolved "atop" this. I see the various circuits as evolutionary cousins but do not require that the same circuitry subserves them. Given this, I am grateful for the review by **Barrett et al.** of functional and structural evidence supporting differential localization of the neuronal modules controlling limb praxis, speech and language, and emotional communication, but puzzled as to why they view these data as justifying rejection of an evolutionary relationship between the underlying mechanisms. **Barrett et al.** assert that TA treats different forelimb gesture classes interchangeably, whereas, e.g., it cites data from Corina et al. which separates pantomime from signing.

There is no space here for a disquisition on mammalian brain evolution. Let me simply refer to Kaas (1993), Butler & Hodos (1996), Krubitzer (1998) and Striedter (2004) for support of the conclusion that increasing complexity of behavior is paralleled by increases in the overall size and number of functional subdivisions of neocortex and the complexity of internal organization of the subdivisions, and that reduplication of circuitry may form the basis for differential evolution of copies of a given system, with differing connectivities, etc., to serve a variety of functions.

**Barrett et al.** usefully summarize data showing that in most humans, the left hemisphere may be dominant in the control of vocalization associated with propositional speech, but the right hemisphere often controls vocalization associated with emotional prosody, automatic speech and singing. Moreover, **Kotchoubey** notes that, although the right temporal lobe is critical for recognition of prosody (R5.3), prosodic aspects of language are also severely impaired in patients with lesions to orbitofrontal cortex (which has links to the mirror system, R 3.2) and the corpus callosum. The latter, presumably, is related to integration between the two hemispheres.

Such data must be taken account in building upon FigureTA6 but do not contradict MSH at its current level of detail.

### *7.2 Action Planning Complements Mirror Systems*

I have already (R2.1) applauded **Bridgeman's** insistence that mirror systems must be supplemented by a planning capability to allow language to evolve. Interestingly, the design of Figure TA6 was motivated in part by the work of Bridgeman. Recall the crucial role of IT and PFC in modulating affordance selection in the FARS model. In the psychophysical experiments of Bridgeman et al. (1997; Bridgeman, 1999), an observer sees a target in one of

several possible positions, and a frame either centered before the observer or deviated left or right. Verbal judgments of the target position are altered by the background frame's position but "jabbing" at the target never misses, regardless of the frame's position. The data demonstrate independent representations of visual space in the two systems, with the observer aware only of the spatial values in the cognitive (inferotemporal) system. The crucial point here is that communication must be based on the size estimate generated by IT, not that generated by PP. Thus all three paths of Figure TA6 are enriched by the prefrontal system which combines current IT-input with memory structures combining objects, actions, and relationships. (The figure just shows the path IT → DPLF as it may affect Wernicke's Area.)

**Bosman et al** disagree with the contrast (Arbib and Bota, 2003) between the MSH theory presented in TA as being "prospective" and the Aboitiz & Garcia (1997) theory as being "retrospective". Our point was that Aboitiz & Garcia focused on lexicon and syntax and looked at what might support them, without suggesting the intermediate stages that might have emerged through evolutionary pressures before language itself "appeared on the scene". As noted in TA, they emphasize working memory while earlier work on MSH failed to do so. Thus the inclusion of working memories in Figure TA6. Further modeling must also take into account issues discussed in R4.1.

Figure TA6 only has auditory input to area Tpt whereas **Rauschecker** notes that auditory objects, including speech sounds, are identified in anterior superior temporal cortex (aST) which projects directly to inferior frontal regions and not along a posterior pathway, as classically assumed. He suggests that aST supports both the decoding of vocalizations in nonhuman primates and the decoding of human speech: "the conclusion is hard to escape that ... nonhuman primate vocalizations are an evolutionary precursor to human speech sounds." (Cf. discussion of **Seyfarth**, R5.3.) However, brain imaging of users of sign language (Emmorey 2002) suggests that the brain regions constituting the perceptual and motor periphery differ between sign (parietal lobe in, manual-facial out) and speech (temporal lobe in; vocal articulatory out), but that there are large overlap regions assumed to be responsible for syntactic and semantic processing at a level abstracted from the peripheral codes. This is the set of "new" regions which my theory begins to explain. Given this, I would not expect "protospeech" as it "spirally evolves" with "protosign" to invent a whole new periphery but rather to co-opt available resources. My impression would be that the auditory system of nonhuman primates is (almost) adequate for speech perception (note the restrictions reviewed by **Horwitz et al.**, R5.2) whereas (R5.4) the motor side needed immense changes to get separable control of vocal articulators to make the sounds of speech (as distinct from primate calls).

## 8. Envoi

By way of conclusion, I simply invite the reader to return to Section 1.1 and assess my claim that, overall, the Extended Mirror System Hypothesis is alive and well. I believe it has survived most of the criticism that would destroy its key claims but that the commentaries provide many challenges for linking the evolving mirror system to other systems and to filling in many details that remain too sketchy or have not yet received due attention.

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